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III Abstract 
 
The 2007/2008 financial crisis and the role that credit rating agencies (CRA’s) played 
leading up to the crisis precipitated the introduction of CRA regulation worldwide. By 
using Giddens’s (1990. 1991) theory of modernity as a framework, this study 
explores the rationale for the introduction of CRA regulation in South Africa (the 
Credit Rating Services Act No. 24 of 2012), with a specific focus on trust and 
legitimacy. The findings in this study suggest that while the introduction of new 
regulation is a mechanism used to legitimise the capital system, it often has 
limitations and unforeseen consequences. This study used detailed interviews with 
some of South Africa’s leading experts on the credit rating industry to explain the 
reasoning for South African CRA regulation. Lastly, this thesis adds to the scant 
body of interpretive (and normative) research on the use of arms-length regulation in 
modern governance discourse, and it is also the first research to explore CRA 
regulation in the South African context.  
  
 
Keywords: Credit rating agencies, Credit Rating Services Act No. 24 of 2012, 
Legitimacy, Regulation, Theory of modernity, Trust.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Purpose and context of the study 
 
This research uses Giddens’s (1990, 1991) theory of modernity to examine credit 
rating agencies (CRA’s) and the regulation of these in South Africa, with a specific 
focus on the newly introduced Credit Rating Services Act No. 24 of 2012 (the Act). 
The thesis will be the first to examine this legislation and the issue of the regulation 
in an African setting. More generally, the research will add to the scant body of 
interpretive (and normative) research on the use of arms-length regulation in modern 
governance discourse1.  
There has been much debate about the causes of the 2007/2008 financial crisis 
(Coffee, 2009). CRA’s have come under scrutiny for the role they played leading up 
to the crisis and, although not the only factor, most authors agree that CRA’s 
contributed to the eventual meltdown of financial markets (Hill, 2010a; White, 
2010a). Governments and regulators worldwide have, therefore, introduced arms-
length CRA regulation to ensure that CRA’s do not repeat past errors (St. Charles, 
2010). Indeed, financial crisis often results in the introduction of new regulations 
(Hancher & Moran, 1989; Malsch & Gendron, 2011). The reasons for this are the 
central focus of this thesis. The introduction of arms-length CRA regulation in South 
Africa following the 2007/2008 crisis raises questions about the legitimacy of the 
capital system and the trust in it. It is for this reason that Giddens’s (1990, 1991) 
modernity theory is used to provide an in-depth analysis of the new CRA regulation 
in South Africa.  
1.2 Research objective 
 
The objective of this study is to explore the rationale for the introduction of CRA 
regulation in South Africa, with particular focus on trust and legitimacy.2 
                                                           
1
 This thesis builds on the work of Rabinowitz and Nana (2013), which provides an overview of CRA’s 
in South Africa. 
2
 This study rejects the positivist need for a hypothesis or research question. This study is exploratory 
in nature and the social constructivist approach that is adopted justifies the use of a research 
objective (Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Clark, 2007; Maroun, 2012).  
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1.3 Significance of the study 
 
This research utilises detailed interviews with some of South Africa’s leading experts 
in the CRA industry to shed light on CRA’s in South Africa, and on the recently 
introduced Credit Rating Services Act (2012). At present, international literature on 
CRA regulation is scant (Partnoy, 1999; White, 2010a). Similarly, no CRA research 
has been conducted in South Africa: this thesis will be the first to address South 
African regulation of local CRA’s, something which is especially important, given the 
central role they play in debt capital markets (Hill, 2010a, 2010b; White, 2010a).  
1.4 Assumptions 
 
This study adopts a social constructivist approach, based on the assumption that 
modern society is not characterised by a single or unique ‘truth’. The socially 
constructed ‘truth’ changes as society changes. This study also assumes that 
interviewees are honest and forthright (despite the number of safeguards put in 
place) (Hopwood, 2000; O’Dwyer, Owen, & Unerman, 2011).  
1.5 Delimitations 
 
This report uses Giddens’s (1990, 1991) theory of modernity to explore CRA 
regulation in South Africa. This report also makes references to Suchman’s (1995) 
legitimacy theory, but the aim of this research is not to examine the theory in detail3. 
Other perspectives or frameworks (models of economic rationality or alternate 
institutional theories) are not applied. 
 
This report uses the regulatory environment in the United States of America (U.S.A) 
as a framework (seeing that the major CRA’s have their headquarters in the U.S.A). 
The central focus of this paper is, however, on CRA’s in South Africa and it must be 
stressed the objective of this study is not to provide a comprehensive history of the 
financial crisis commencing in 2007/2008. 
 
                                                           
3
 This is because modernity theory already caters for the relevance of institutional legitimacy 
(Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004).  
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This research does not deal with the different methodologies used by the CRA’s to 
compute their ratings. Furthermore, the informational value of credit ratings may be 
mentioned but the main aim of this paper is to provide a perspective on CRA’s in 
South Africa. Lastly, sovereign ratings and unsolicited ratings are not part of the 
scope of this paper. 
1.6 Structure of this thesis 
 
Section 2 presents a review of prior literature on the given subject. Section 2.1 
introduces Giddens’s (1990; 1991) theory of modernity to provide a theoretical 
framework for analysing results, Section 2.2 examines the relevance of regulation 
and Section 2.3 gives a detailed background and explanation of CRA’s. 
Section 3 describes the research method, namely semi-structured interviews. Other 
issues such as purposive sampling, reliability and validity measures, ethical 
considerations and the design of the interview agenda are also addressed.  
Section 4 presents a detailed discussion of the findings. It consists of two main 
subsections: Section 4.1 (Regulation legitimises the capital system) and Section 4.2 
(The limitations and unforeseen consequences of regulation). Lastly, Section 5 
concludes. Section 5.1 contains summarising comments and Section 5.2 discusses 
the contribution of this thesis. Section 5.3 concludes with the limitations of this 
research and areas for future research.   
2. Literature review 
2.1 Modernity Theory 
 
Giddens (1990, p. 94) defines modernity as: 
‘...a shorthand term for modern society, or industrial civilisation. Portrayed in more detail, it is 
associated with (1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world as open 
to transformation, by human intervention; (2) a complex of economic institutions, especially 
industrial production and a market economy; and (3) a certain range of political institutions, 
including the nation-state and mass democracy’ 
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Giddens (1990, 1991) asserts that past events significantly affect peoples’ 
knowledge and understanding. The theory also states that modern financial and 
economic practices such as accounting, auditing and credit rating analysis have 
been socially constructed. They reflect the cumulative experiences of stakeholders 
and the prevailing social, political and economic context. The result is that global 
economic failures (such as Enron in 2001 and the global financial crisis, 
commencing in 2008) have far-reaching effects (Giddens, 1990; Partnoy, 2009c; 
Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). They alter the relevant jurisdiction’s governance 
systems and can engender changes in other locations over time (Partnoy, 2009c). 
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004), for example, analyse the effects of the accounting 
scandals at the turn of the century, with specific reference to Giddens’s (1990, 1991) 
theory regarding late modernity. The accounting scandals (a time distanciation), 
which rocked corporate America in the early 2000’s, resulted in a loss of trust by 
non-experts (outsiders to the expert systems of auditing and accounting). They also 
culminated in the additional use of regulation to ensure minimum levels of audit 
quality (Maroun & Solomon, 2013).  A predicted space distanciation (per modernity 
theory) also resulted in a proliferation of external regulation in other jurisdictions 
which were made reflexively aware of the limitations of existing systems of checks 
and balances (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). The same may apply to a perceived 
need for additional regulation of financial systems. Just as financial scandals at 
Enron et al in accounting and auditing circles precipitates arms-length regulation of 
the respective professions (Malsch & Gendron, 2011), a crisis of confidence, 
sparked by the 2008 financial crisis, leads to a reflexive withdrawal of trust in rating 
systems and the need for additional regulation of the CRA’s (Partnoy, 2009c). 
2.2 On the relevance of regulation 
 
Financial gatekeepers (auditors, investment bankers, CRA’s, lawyers and regulators) 
form part of the system of checks and balances which ensures good corporate 
governance (Lessing, 2009). Several well-known corporate failures, such as those at 
Enron, have been attributed in part, to a breakdown, of corporate governance 
systems (Brennan & Solomon, 2008). Coffee (2002), however, asserts that the 
Enron scandal was a direct result of gatekeeper failure, rather than Board failure. He 
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defines gatekeepers as ‘reputational intermediaries who provide verification and 
certification services to investors’. These include auditors, securities analysts and 
credit rating agencies (Coffee, 2002, p. 15). The Enron scandal raises the question: 
why did gatekeepers allow management to perpetrate fraud?  
The ‘bubble’ economy which characterised equity markets in the late 1990’s induced 
a euphoric atmosphere in which gatekeepers were rendered temporarily redundant. 
It seems that gatekeepers are only seen as necessary when investors are cautious 
and sceptical (Coffee, 2002). In terms of modernity theory, with outsiders to expert 
systems unable to understand fully the functioning of organisations, most are happy 
to assume that underlying expert systems function as they are intended, to 
safeguard the interests of stakeholders (Giddens, 1990). When, however, these 
systems fail, stakeholders become reflexively aware of the limitations of the capital 
market system (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). This is followed by calls for 
independent audit committees, the use of non-executive directors; the development 
of codes of ethics; and the proliferation of regulatory bodies (Malsch & Gendron, 
2011; Maroun & Solomon, 2013). In this way, the evolution of corporate governance 
systems, and institutionalisation of arms-length regulation, suggests that market 
forces alone are unable to regulate capital markets and that, after significant 
corporate failure, some form of intervention by the State is required (Malsch & 
Gendron, 2011).  
‘The truth is most of the individual mistakes boil down to just one: a belief that markets are 
self-adjusting and that the role of government should be minimal. Looking back at that belief 
during hearings this fall on Capitol Hill, Alan Greenspan said out loud, "I have found a flaw." 
Congressman Henry Waxman pushed him, responding, "In other words, you found that your 
view of the world, your ideology, was not right; it was not working." "Absolutely, precisely," 
Greenspan said. The embrace by America - and much of the rest of the world - of this flawed 
economic philosophy made it inevitable that we would eventually arrive at the place we are 
today’. (Stiglitz, 2009, p. 1) 
 
The cause of the 2007/2008 financial crisis cannot be blamed on one decision or 
event. Rather, ‘mistakes were made at every fork in the road’, with disastrous 
consequences (Stiglitz, 2009, p. 1). According to Stiglitz (2009), the philosophy of 
deregulation which was adopted by the U.S.A government in the 1980’s eventually 
culminated in the 2008 financial crisis. The repeal in 1999 of the Glass-Steagall Act 
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(an Act which had separated commercial and investment banks since the Great 
Depression) and the decision by the United States Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in 2004, to allow investment banks to increase their debt-to-capital ratio 
(which allowed them to purchase more mortgage-backed securities, thus inflating the 
housing bubble), were two high profile errors. The refusal to regulate derivatives and 
the inability to deal with the problems caused by stock options and other incentives 
for company executives, are also cited as key failures. It seems that most of the 
decisions which led to the crisis were a direct result of the deregulatory philosophy 
adopted in the U.S.A at the time (Eichengreen, 2008; Stiglitz, 2009).  
 
The result has been the proliferation of external regulation over capital market 
systems, including, for example, audit and corporate reporting regulation (Malsch & 
Gendron, 2011; Tremblay & Gendron, 2011). The rationale for introducing regulation 
is an important issue to consider. It seems that new regulation is often introduced in 
response to a specific crisis (Frankel, 2002; Jackson, 2004; Malsch & Gendron, 
2011; Maroun & Solomon, 2013). Regulations and laws are often relaxed in 
prosperous economic times. When markets deflate or financial crises occur, there 
appears to be a proliferation of regulation (Malsch & Gendron, 2011; Maroun & 
Solomon, 2013). This can be described as a ‘pendulum’ effect (Litan, 2013; Minsky, 
1978). 
 
‘There is much evidence that the government tightens regulation following market crashes 
and relaxes regulation as market prices rise. In the 1930’s, there was no market to speak of, 
and the existing financial infrastructure did not work. Investors were gone. Yet, during those 
years, Congress passed regulation that was unheard of in strictness and intrusion, as 
compared to existing State regulation that governed the field until then. In 1970, after the 
market deflated from the bubble of the 1960’s, Congress again amended the laws by 
tightening regulation, and in 1975 Congress restructured the markets at a higher cost to the 
financial system. Similarly, after the 1987 crash, there was a flurry of activity by Congress and 
State legislatures’ (Frankel, 2002, p. 440). 
The same lesson applies when considering the 2007/2008 financial crisis. Frankel 
(2002) asserts that regulation plays an important role in strengthening trust in the 
capital system. She compares the trustworthiness of the capital system to 
reputational concerns: 
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‘Financial institutions and regulators respond to the weakening trust in the markets by 
assuring investors that their suspicions are unfounded. One can analogise the trustworthiness 
of the system to reputation. To reap future benefits from the financial markets, financial 
institutions and Congress invest in building up the markets’ reputation for trustworthiness. But 
when times are good, Congress and the industry over-consume the fruit of a good reputation 
and deplete its value. When events lead investors to question the system’s trustworthiness, 
Congress, the issuers and the industry start to repair the damage and invest in market 
reputation again. When investors’ trust is restored, industry pressures increase to reduce the 
cost of capital formation. Investors do not seem to mind. Regulation is relaxed. And when 
prices fall, the cycle starts all over again.’ (Frankel, 2002, p. 443) 
According to Jackson (2004), there is a fine line between adequate regulation and 
over-regulation. Over-regulation can be just as dangerous as under-regulation, with 
the result that governments need to balance the prescription of rules and principles 
when developing new regulations with the need for a degree of self-regulation 
(Bratton, 2003; Burgemeestre, Hulstijn, & Tan, 2009; Coffee & Sale, 2009) 4 . 
Regulators also have to weigh the costs of law-making against the risk of 
reoccurrence of identified failures (Arjoon, 2006).  
 
Irrespective of the extent to which regulatory environments rely on rules or principles, 
what is key is the power of new laws and regulations to reassure stakeholders that 
confidence in the capital market system is justified, particularly in the aftermath of a 
scandal (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). As explained by Frankel (2002) and Brescia 
(2009), trust and trustworthiness are fundamental to the functioning of the capital 
system. Regulation or State law can have the effect of promoting behaviour that 
engenders trust and cooperation from market participants (Brescia, 2009). 
 
With weaknesses in the expert system apparent to stakeholders, additional 
regulation becomes an important mechanism for introducing reform to prevent the 
reoccurrence of identified failures (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). Modernity theory 
also suggests that, due to the social construction of capital institutions, the symbolic 
potential of regulation should not be overlooked (Giddens, 1991). Even if a new law 
is unable to produce a radical change in regulated practice, the mere fact that the 
                                                           
4
 This study focuses more on the body tasked with introducing, implementing and overseeing 
regulation. This leads to a debate about independent government regulation or self-regulation. 
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State is intervening at a time of perceived crisis is a powerful display which 
reassures non-experts of the credibility of the respective institution (Unerman & 
O’Dwyer, 2004).  
 
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004) provide an example of this process in their analysis of 
accounting scandals at the turn of the century. The accounting scandals that rocked 
corporate America in the early 2000’s resulted in a loss of trust among non-experts 
(outsiders from the expert systems of auditing and accounting). The introduction of 
strong regulation to guard against failures in the future was seen by politicians and 
experts as the way to restore trust in accounting and auditing systems (Unerman & 
O’Dwyer, 2004). The loss of trust in professional accounting and auditing caused 
non-experts to change their ‘acceptable levels of risk’. Non-experts also became 
aware of the pervasive nature of accounting and auditing in stock markets and 
individuals’ everyday lives (such as pension funds and in some cases, continued 
employment). After some initial reluctance, politicians agreed to the introduction of 
regulation as a means to restore the trust of non-experts in the accounting and 
auditing systems (Giddens, 1991; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004, p. 972). 
 
A paradox results in that regulation appears to bolster trust in the capital system. The 
only reason that regulation is, however, required is because trust itself is no longer 
adequate (Black, Hopper, & Band, 2007). As explained by Giddens (1990, 1991), the 
complexity of periods of late modernity means that the tension between regulation 
and trust is overlooked by most stakeholders. Instead, additional regulation becomes 
a substitute for trust ensuring the continuation in the taken-for-granted belief that the 
capital market system functions (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). 
 
Another key element with respect to regulation is the political agenda of powerful 
stakeholders. Black (2010) cites the United Kingdom’s choice of principles-based 
regulation as a political tool used to attract foreign investment. Due to the Utopian 
image created by such a system, principles-based regulation was used as a 
‘weapon’ in the battle for business between New York and London (Black, 2010, p. 
12). This ‘modus’ was effective because the majority of large initial public offerings in 
2005 took place in London and not New York (Ford, 2008). The use of a specific 
brand or a type of regulation as a tool to increase business and attract foreign 
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investment begs the question: do firms, politicians and regulators alike truly believe 
in the value of their regulatory systems or do they tactically choose regulation to 
maintain appearances, minimise costs and increase profits (Black, 2010)?       
 
The use of regulation as a political tool to attract foreign investment mirrors DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) model of mimetic isomorphism:  
‘Organisations tend to model themselves after similar organisations in their field that they 
perceive to be more legitimate or successful. The ubiquity of certain kinds of structural 
arrangements can more likely be credited to the universality of mimetic processes than to any 
concrete evidence that the adopted models enhance efficiency.’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 
152) 
 
The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the proliferation of State regulation of the 
capital market system over the last 20 years. With trust in the capital market shaken 
by Enron, Parmalat, WorldCom and – more recently – the 2007/2008 financial crisis, 
deregulation loses favour (Black, 2010; Black et al., 2007; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 
2004). As predicted by modernity theory, politicians, regulators and firms align 
themselves with the regulatory reform movements in order to create the perception 
that their economy is successful and reputable. In doing so, they achieve market 
growth, gain economic credibility and secure their political power (Unerman & 
O’Dwyer, 2004). As discussed above, even if actual material changes to the capital 
system are not achieved, mimetic isomorphism allows regulators to create the 
appearance of reform and win continued support from constituents (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).   
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004) reiterate this point, urging scepticism when evaluating 
the rationale for the introduction of recently enacted regulation. Although politicians 
and regulators may claim that new regulation is aimed at restoring trust, the 
introduction of regulation is in their best interests. If trust in the system were not 
restored, their positions in late-modernist society (in which they function 
successfully) would be threatened (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). Frankel (2002) 
supports this view, arguing that government policies oscillate between the use of 
regulation and deregulation depending on market and political expediency. (Black, 
2010) provides a recent example dealing with the 2007/2008 financial crisis:  
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She describes how accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom, as discussed 
above, resulted in a shift away from self-regulatory models. This marked a period of 
increased state-intervention, an approach to regulation which was lauded by many 
and marketed as aiming to help markets to avoid regulatory failures in the future 
(Malsch & Gendron, 2011; Tremblay & Gendron, 2011). In the aftermath of the 2008 
crisis, however, fundamental questions about the regulatory approach for the 
Financial Services sector arose. Pre-crisis, the new governance approach 5  was 
generally accepted as effective and responsive to firms and regulators. Post-crisis, 
the same approach has been criticised by many as one of the main causes of the 
crisis. It has been described as ‘light touch’ regulation for banks and rating agencies 
which placed too much responsibility on the respective firms to act responsibly 
(Black, 2010, p. 3; Coffee, 2009).  
 
Through the lens of modernity theory, the financial crisis highlights inadequacies of 
regulation in the financial services sector. Reflexivity and disembedding mechanisms 
lead to parallels between current and prior regulatory failures being drawn by non-
experts.  The result is a flurry of criticism attributing the blame for the current crisis to 
a ‘laissez-faire’ attitude of regulators (Ford, 2010, p. 3). For governments to retain 
their credibility, introducing a new round of regulatory reform becomes paramount 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995).  
 
Of particular interest for the purpose of this research is the development of 
regulations for the credit rating industry. As discussed in Section 2.3.4 below, the 
sector has moved from a period of self-regulation to a current regulatory environment 
characterised by considerable monitoring by governments.  
 
 
 
                                                           
5
 According to Ford (2008), new governance refers to an innovative, pragmatic and flexible approach 
to regulation, as opposed to the rigid rules-based approach. 
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2.3 Credit rating agencies 
2.3.1 History of CRA’s 
 
CRA’s originated in the U.S.A. The first publicly available bond ratings were 
published by John Moody in 1909. Those initial ratings were focused on railroad 
activities, as the U.S.A had embarked on massive infrastructure projects at the time, 
and vast amounts of capital were needed to fund the projects. Moody’s Investor 
Service (Moody’s) was followed by Poor’s Publishing Company in 1916, the 
Standards Statistics Company in 1922 and the Fitch Publishing Company (Fitch) in 
1924. The Standards Statistics Company and the Poor’s Publishing Company 
subsequently merged in 1941 to become what is still known today as Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P). Presently, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch are known as the ‘Big Three’ 
CRA’s and they hold ninety eight percent of the world market share for ratings 
(Mulligan, 2009, p. 1279). Initially these CRA’s published their ratings in ‘thick rating 
manuals’. At that stage, the agencies adopted an ‘investor-pays’ business model6 
(White, 2012, p. 5). (Please refer to Section 2.3.2 for a more detailed discussion of 
the business models employed). 
Following the Great Depression in 1929, bank regulators passed regulation whereby 
banking institutions were only allowed to invest in ‘investment grade bonds’ as 
determined by ‘recognised ratings manuals’ published by the CRA’s. The insurance 
industry and federal pension regulators followed suit shortly thereafter. This meant 
that the largest investors in bonds had to rely on the ratings of the CRA’s in order to 
invest in so-called ‘safe bonds’. White (2012, p. 6) states that these ‘delegations of 
safety judgements to the rating agencies meant that the latter's centrality for bond 
market information was further strengthened’ (White, 2012). 
The SEC cemented the importance of the CRA’s in 1975 by imposing ‘minimum 
capital requirements for broker-dealers’, which included ‘major investment banks and 
securities firms’ (White, 2010a). The SEC also created a category called nationally 
recognised statistical rating organisation (NRSRO). The three CRA’s were 
immediately admitted to this NRSRO category. The SEC stipulated that only NRSRO 
                                                           
6
 Under the investor-pays model, CRA’s generate revenue by charging investors for access to their 
rating assessments. Under this model, ratings are only available to paying investors, as opposed to 
the whole market. 
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ratings were to be used in determining capital requirements for ‘broker-dealers’. In 
addition, other financial regulators also adopted this new NRSRO category (White, 
2010a, p. 213). 
Sylla (2002) provides a detailed history of credit ratings. According to Sylla (2002, p. 
23), the advent of huge infrastructural projects undertaken in the U.S.A in the late 
1700’s and 1800’s led to the expansion of the American economy. The U.S.A 
‘economy was of continental proportions’ and there was a great need for capital to 
fund the building of railroad infrastructure that would facilitate easy movement of 
goods throughout the country. Mercantile rating agencies originated in 1841 and they 
rated businesses’ creditworthiness. In 1909 John Moody published the first publicly 
available bond ratings and these ratings related specifically to bonded railroad debts. 
The CRA’s soon began rating all kinds of bonds and securitised debt (Cantor & 
Packer, 1994; Sylla, 2002). 
More recent studies by White (2010a, 2012) offer a thorough history of modern 
CRA’s. The history is vital to the understanding of how the CRA’s became such 
integral players in the bond and debt markets. White (2010a) explains how the 
regulation that was introduced in the 1930’s and subsequently the 1970’s (i.e. the 
introduction of the NRSRO category by the SEC) cemented the role of CRA’s in the 
market. White (2010a) also points out that the effective delegation of safety 
judgements to the CRA’s by regulators (without a degree of control over their 
operations) would ultimately ensure that, when CRA’s made mistakes, ‘those 
mistakes would have serious consequences’ for financial markets (White, 2010a, p. 
212).  
White (2012) also describes the role CRA’s played in the subprime debacle that led 
to the 2008 financial crisis. He suggests that less regulation may be the answer for 
the credit rating industry, and he cites the failures of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
and the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 as examples of additional 
regulation that were ineffective. 
Partnoy (1999) dismisses the reputational capital theory with regard to CRA’s. The 
reputational capital theory refers to the view that CRA’s rely on their good 
reputations in order to maintain and increase their customer base and revenue. He 
contends that CRA’s do not rely on their reputations or the quality of their ratings to 
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solicit business, as would be the case in a free market. Rather, CRA’s have been 
able to take advantage of regulation that has made them key players in debt 
markets. CRA’s operate in an oligopolistic market and CRA’s effectively sell 
‘regulatory licenses’ (Partnoy, 1999, p. 682). Deb, Manning, Murphy, Penalver, and 
Toth (2011) agree that reputational concerns are not prioritised by CRA’s.  
Gatekeepers are unlikely to protect their reputational capital when their exposure to 
liability declines, coupled with incentives to acquiesce to increased client demand 
(Coffee, 2002). With specific reference to CRA’s, Partnoy (1999) dismisses the 
reputational capital view, as a result of their minimal exposure to liability and their 
power to sell regulatory licenses. Coffee (2002) concludes that gatekeeper failure is 
to be expected in times of market euphoria because gatekeepers lose leverage over 
their clients: 
 
‘Popular commentary has instead used softer-edged concepts - such as “infectious greed” 
and a decline in morality - to explain the same phenomena. Yet, there is little evidence that 
“greed” has ever declined; nor is it clear that there are relevant policy options for addressing 
it. In contrast, focusing on gatekeepers tells us that there are special actors in a system of 
private corporate governance whose incentives must be regulated.’ (Coffee, 2002, p. 1419) 
 
Furthermore, CRA’s are different from other ‘financial gatekeepers’. Some of the 
main differences highlighted include: (1) despite the poor performance of CRA’s, 
they have become more ‘prominent and important’, (2) they have been ‘immune from 
civil and criminal liability for malfeasance’ and (3) they are very profitable (Partnoy, 
2006, p. 61). 
Mählmann (2006, p. 21) states that CRA’s (specifically, Moody’s and S&P) have 
‘historically neither advocated nor encouraged the use of ratings in regulation’. 
Mählmann (2006) explains that one of the main concerns of CRA’s was that making 
ratings mandatory would turn ratings into a commodity, thus forcing smaller rating 
firms to compete based on the price and level of the ratings issued, as opposed to 
their reputations and the quality of their ratings. 
 
Partnoy (2002) perceives a paradox in the CRA industry. The paradox seems to be 
that credit ratings from approved NRSRO CRA’s are vital in debt markets, yet their 
‘informational value’ is limited, at best:  
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‘Paradoxically, the leading NRSRO’s became more profitable even as the quality of their 
ratings declined. Operating margins in recent years topped fifty percent; Moody’s profit 
margins were higher than any other company in the S&P 500 for five consecutive years 
during the early 2000’s. Moody’s market capitalization was nearly $20 billion at its peak; S&P 
was similarly profitable and large. The companies that owned NRSRO’s drew savvy investors, 
looking to profit from the reliable returns associated with the sale of regulatory licences.’ 
(Partnoy, 2009a, p. 6) 
 
2.3.2 The change in business model 
 
Prior to the 1970’s, CRA’s earned their keep from selling agency reports to their 
subscribers – that is, investors and other users of the credit ratings issued by the 
CRA paid for that information (Sylla, 2002). In the 1970’s there was a shift in the 
business model adopted by the CRA’s. They moved from an ‘investor-pays’ model to 
an ‘issuer-pays’ model (White, 2010a, p. 214). This shift in business model 
enhanced the profitability of CRA’s and allowed them to expand the services they 
could offer (Cantor & Packer, 1994). A number of reasons for the shift in the 
business model were offered by the CRA’s. 
First, the sales revenues from the ‘ratings manuals’ came under threat as a result of 
the introduction of the ‘high-speed photocopy machine’, which would have 
significantly affected the CRA’s revenue as investors could copy the manuals and 
share them freely (White, 2010a, p. 214). Second, Penn Central defaulted on $82 
million of commercial paper in 1970. Cantor and Packer (1994, p. 4) see this as a 
‘catalyst’ for the change in business model. As a result of this default, investors 
required reassurance from issuers. This reassurance came in the form of issuers 
‘actively’ pursuing credit ratings and it seems this became the ‘established market 
practice’ from then on (Cantor & Packer, 1994, p. 13). Last, the CRA’s recognised 
their importance in the market after having been incorporated into legislation (as 
explained above). They felt that issuers should ‘pay for the privilege’ of having an 
official rating from one of the CRA’s (White, 2010a). 
 
While the above reasons have been offered, they are contested and do not entirely 
justify the shift in the business model. At best, they are less than definitive (White, 
2010a). Coffee (2010, p. 264) suggests that a ‘government-created and managed 
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rating agency’ could be a possible alternative to the issuer-pays model and the lack 
of competition in the CRA industry. Introducing a government rating agency has, 
however, a number of advantages and disadvantages (Coffee, 2010). In particular, 
Kudva (2010, p. 1) states: 
 
‘The investor-pays model creates an inherent bias towards credit rating agencies giving 
lower-than-warranted ratings, so that investors would get a higher yield. And pressures from 
investors to avoid rating downgrades would increase considerably, since downgrades result in 
mark-to-market losses on rated securities.’ 
The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2012) seems to have 
identified alternative business models for NRSRO compensation. Some models 
seem more advanced than others, but none has been implemented. It seems that 
the creators of these alternative models have not pursued their models further 
because there is little or no incentive to continue developing these models due to the 
lack of attention to and interest in these from regulators in the U.S.A (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2012). Kudva (2010, p. 1) states that every model 
has ‘pro’s and con’s’, but the key factor is how well conflicts of interest are managed. 
2.3.3 Role in recent financial crises 
 
Hill (2009) points out that CRA’s made many mistakes before Enron. Enron had an 
investment grade rating four days before it declared bankruptcy. She states that the 
‘rating agency hall of shame’ includes several debacles, including Executive Life, the 
Asian Flu, Orange County, and National Century Financial Enterprises (Hill, 2009, p. 
291). 
Partnoy (2009a) claims that one of the causes of the financial crisis in 2008 was 
market overdependence on credit ratings. This view seems to be mirrored by Mizen 
(2008), who states that the CRA’s failed to obtain enough information to provide 
accurate ratings. While Acharya and Richardson (2009) do not cite the CRA’s as the 
ultimate reason for the financial crisis, they do highlight the fact that conflicts of 
interest might have arisen due to the CRA’s prioritising fees over accurate ratings. 
This further contests the reasons offered by the CRA’s attempting to justify their shift 
in business models. 
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According to Rafailov (2011), the CRAs’ principal mistake was that they failed to 
correctly assess the underlying risk of mortgage-backed securities that were issued 
wholesale, leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. The failure of the CRA’s to rate the 
credit risk of structured financial instruments accurately was a major factor in the 
financial crisis. Hill (2010a, p. 332) describes the CRA’s as ‘villains’. The CRA’s rank 
second in her list of four main ‘villains’ who caused the financial crisis. Hill’s (2010a) 
list of villains also includes ‘mortgage brokers and originators’ as first, ‘lawyers and 
investment bankers’ as third and ‘buyers of subprime securities’ as fourth. (Hill, 
2010a, p. 332) states that ‘mortgage brokers and originators’ committed blatantly 
illegal acts. The CRA’s come second as they ‘lied and/or exaggerated’ when it came 
to rating complex repackaged securities. 
In the U.S.A there were several issues which eventually led to the crisis. An 
emphasis was placed on increasing homeownership by the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations in the years before the crisis. The mortgage industry also changed 
dramatically – loans were sold off quickly and repackaged to sell to international 
investors. A plethora of new types of mortgage products emerged and the incentives 
of the multiple stakeholders (including mortgage brokers, lenders, and Wall Street 
firms) in these products became more focused on the quantity of products being 
bought and sold than on the underlying quality of those products. Securitisation also 
proliferated in the years before the 2007/2008 crisis and this resulted in subprime 
and other mortgage products being transformed into highly complex financial 
instruments that CRA’s were contracted to rate (The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (FCIC), 2011; White, 2010a). The FCIC (2011) elaborate on the 
implications of this:        
 
‘Put simply and most pertinently, structured finance was the mechanism by which subprime 
and other mortgages were turned into complex investments often accorded triple-A ratings by 
credit rating agencies whose own motives were conflicted. This entire market depended on 
finely honed computer models—which turned out to be divorced from reality—and on ever-
rising housing prices. When that bubble burst, the complexity bubble also burst: the securities 
almost no one understood, backed by mortgages no lender would have signed 20 years 
earlier, were the first dominoes to fall in the financial sector’ (FCIC, 2011, p. 28). 
 
‘While the vulnerabilities that created the potential for crisis were years in the making, it was 
the collapse of the housing bubble - fuelled by low interest rates, easy and available credit, 
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scant regulation, and toxic mortgages - that was the spark that ignited a string of events, 
which led to a full-blown crisis in the fall of 2008. Trillions of dollars in risky mortgages had 
become embedded throughout the financial system, as mortgage-related securities were 
packaged, repackaged, and sold to investors around the world. When the bubble burst, 
hundreds of billions of dollars in losses in mortgages and mortgage-related securities shook 
markets as well as financial institutions that had significant exposures to those mortgages and 
had borrowed heavily against them. This happened not just in the United States but around 
the world. The losses were magnified by derivatives such as synthetic securities.’ (FCIC, 
2011, p. xvi). 
 
Hill (2011a) states that self-deception played a big role in CRA’s failures leading to 
the crisis. It does not suffice merely to blame CRA corruption, complacency or a lack 
of technical expertise. Despite mandated regulatory use of ratings, if CRA’s had 
been obviously complacent or lacking in technical skills, the U.S. government and 
markets would have reacted accordingly and sought alternatives. CRA’s have also 
proved that they are capable of being honest and reliable when rating plain-vanilla 
debt instruments (Hill, 2011a; White, 2010a). When it came to rating complex 
structured securities where the incentives and returns were far higher than vanilla 
instruments, there is evidence that both corruption and a lack of expertise played a 
part. It seems, however, that the over-arching reasons for CRA failures can be 
traced back to self-deception, as well as market euphoria and the illusion that risk 
had, in fact, been removed (Hill, 2010b, 2011a).   
 
A further criticism of CRA’s is that they failed to verify public information or 
information provided to them by issuers in the years leading up to the 2008 crisis. 
‘Rating agencies not only appear culpable for facilitating the crisis but also may be grossly 
negligent, if not wilfully complicit, in papering over its magnitude and allowing the bubble 
market to grow even more.’ (Manns, 2009, p. 1022) 
 
It seems that CRA’s took the view that it was not their responsibility to verify 
information and this led to their taking information at face value (Coffee, 2009; Darcy, 
2009),  and LaFrance (2008)). Nevertheless, Manns (2009, p. 1022) argues that 
CRA’s have ‘responsibility without accountability’.  
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According to White (2010a), in the past, CRA’s have referred to their ratings as 
opinions because this supports their claim that they are publishers. The implication 
of this is that they have enjoyed protection from liability under the First Amendment 
of the U.S.A Constitution. Harper (2011) argues that CRA’s should not enjoy First 
Amendment protection for the ratings of complex structured securities. What this 
disconnect between the reliance placed on ratings by stakeholders and current 
levels of accountability ultimately highlights is the need for effective regulation of the 
CRA’s.  
Hill (2009) is sceptical about the conventional reasons given for CRA failures leading 
up to the 2008 crisis. Although the argument of conflicts of interest in the CRA 
industry holds much appeal, Hill (2009) asserts that the reasons for CRA failures are 
far more complex. She dismisses possible solutions such as increased liability, the 
elimination of the NRSRO category and proposed measures to deal with conflicts of 
interest.  
Hill (2009) argues that, although the failings of certain market players ultimately 
caused the crisis, there was a broader issue in the background – market participants 
convinced themselves that they had entered into a world where risk had been 
removed. Market participants ‘drank the Kool Aid’ (Hill, 2010b, p. 2) that 
demonstrated their belief that risk had essentially been managed and overcome: 
‘Rating agencies are indeed in the business of assessing credit quality, but many brilliant and 
sophisticated market participants with considerable amounts of money at stake and 
considerable access to information about the securities and about markets generally made 
the same mistake the rating agencies did. These instruments were not bought by widows and 
orphans who might more reasonably have unquestioningly relied on rating agency ratings.’  
(Hill, 2010b, p. 14) 
2.3.4 The need for CRA regulation: Regulation in the U.S.A 
 
As discussed in Section 2.2, ‘crisis and regulation intertwine’. It also appears that 
regulation is often used in political power games (Malsch & Gendron, 2011, p. 2).   
While the aim of the SEC in establishing the NRSRO category was to force issuers 
to obtain ratings from reliable sources, the establishment of the NRSRO category 
has presented its own set of unforeseen consequences. Its establishment has 
become a barrier to entry for new entrants and it has given huge power to the 
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incumbent players. Delegating the ‘safety-and-soundness judgements’ to the CRA’s 
has also had its flaws - the CRA’s have made several costly errors (White, 2006, p. 
1). The SEC’s decision to bestow the special NRSRO status on CRA’s (thus handing 
them regulatory licenses (Partnoy, 1999) resulted in CRA’s having immense power 
over debt capital markets (White, 2010a). The extent or the perception of the extent 
of this power is summarised by Friedman (1995): 
 
‘There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There’s the United States and 
there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, 
and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it’s not clear 
sometimes who’s more powerful.’ 
 
In the past decade (as a result of Enron and the 2008 financial crisis) regulators 
have begun paying more attention to CRA’s. CRA’s were self-regulated entities until 
fairly recently. The recent scandals have prompted government regulation in many 
jurisdictions around the world (St. Charles, 2010). St. Charles (2010) compares 
European and American CRA regulation and she advocates bilateral dialogue 
between international regulators in order to avoid cross-border regulatory 
complications. 
 
Like White (2010b), who believes that less regulation is the way forward, Richardson 
and White (2009) question whether regulation is the answer for the CRA industry. 
They refer to a system where the NRSRO category is abolished and investors and 
issuers are free to seek advice on creditworthiness from a variety of sources 
(Richardson & White, 2009). Others, such as Hill (2004, p. 95), however, believe that 
regulatory reform is needed and that eliminating the NRSRO category might be wise, 
provided that ‘the process is carefully managed’. 
 
Coffee (2010) is of the opinion that regulation is needed in order to induce the 
correct incentives in financial markets for CRA’s. A market where CRA’s are 
incentivised to compete for the favour of investors should mean that less regulation 
and oversight are needed. Conversely, where such incentives are absent, close 
regulatory oversight is required. Coffee (2010, p. 276) is critical of CRA reform 
proposals that do not address the issuer-pays model. He refers to such reform 
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proposals as a re-arrangement of the ‘deck chairs on the Titanic’. Hill (2011b) agrees 
that the issuer-pays business model must be abolished in order to increase 
competition and generate overall improvements in the CRA’s industry.  
Coffee (2010) insists that market participants must acknowledge the failings of 
CRA’s leading up to the crisis and they must seek ways to align the incentives of 
CRA’s and regulators to avoid such failings in the future:  
‘On both sides of the Atlantic, there should be a recognition that (1) the existing market for 
ratings failed, (2) voluntary self-regulation and reliance on the rating agency’s desire to 
protect its “reputational capital” is inadequate, and (3) incentives must be aligned so that the 
watchdog is motivated to watch carefully...If we get the incentives right, relatively little 
regulation is needed. But if the incentives remain poorly aligned, it is unclear whether any 
level of regulation can ensure ratings accuracy.’ (Coffee, 2010) 
 
Partnoy (2009b) introduces two important ideas about how CRA regulation can be 
reformed. His first idea is to make CRA’s accountable for the ratings they give and to 
eliminate their exemption from liability (CRA’s have enjoyed exemption from liability 
for their ratings and it has not been possible to take legal action against them). His 
second idea is to introduce competition into the oligopolistic CRA industry and to 
reduce reliance on credit ratings (Partnoy, 2009b). On the other hand, Katz, Munoz, 
and Stephanou (2009, p. 1) assess the policy responses to the 2008 crisis and offer 
some advice to improve the CRA industry while acknowledging that solutions to 
mend the system will not be ‘easy’. (Katz et al., 2009) suggest that reducing reliance 
on CRA’s and re-assessing the business model might improve the CRA industry. 
 
Goodhart (2010) dismisses some of the suggestions for reform to make CRA’s 
trustworthy in the eyes of all stakeholders. Holding CRA’s legally liable for faulty 
ratings would render the CRA business unviable. CRA’s provide an opinion of 
creditworthiness – Goodhart (2010) is cynical about attempts to hold CRA’s legally 
liable – he asks what would happen if central banks, economists and governments 
were also held legally liable for their opinions or forecasts. Goodhart (2010) also 
rejects the idea of a change in business model to investor-pays. Lastly, government 
involvement in the CRA industry by way of a government CRA or a government-
promoted CRA is also dismissed because of concerns about trust and objectivity 
(Goodhart, 2010). 
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White (2011) and Harper (2011) agree that the introduction of new regulation makes 
it increasingly difficult for new entrants into the CRA industry. White (2011) states 
that some CRA sections in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) (2010) may increase barriers to entry for new 
entrants and may make the incumbent CRA’s more central to bond markets in the 
future. Harper (2011) doubts whether new entrants will be able to build good 
reputations to become NRSRO’s, seeing that this attempt will expose them to 
increased liability, coupled with reduced reliance on NRSRO ratings. White (2010b) 
calls for less regulation of CRA’s. His opinion is that the SEC should abolish the 
NRSRO category, thus opening up the market for information on debt instruments. 
White (2010a, p. 223) further argues that more regulation would likely raise barriers 
to entry and ‘ironically’ reinforce the position of the big three CRA’s.  
 
The U.S.A regulatory response to the 2008 financial crisis was the introduction of the 
Dodd-Frank Act (2010). The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) was signed into federal law in 
July 2010. There are several sections of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) that affect 
CRA’s. The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) endeavours to increase accountability and 
oversight of the credit rating industry (Martin & Franker, 2011). Among other things, 
the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) also aims to reduce regulatory reliance on credit ratings, 
remove references to credit ratings from law, increase transparency in the credit 
rating industry and address conflicts of interest (Cane, Shamir, & Jodar, 2011). White 
(2011) believes that eliminating regulatory reliance on CRA’s will reduce the 
importance of the big three CRA’s in the future (perhaps eliminating the NRSRO 
category) and allow market forces to prevail. Katz et al. (2009) agree that reducing 
reliance on ratings might improve the CRA industry. 
The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) hints at the introduction of a CRA industry regulator – 
the SEC has commissioned a study to assess this possibility. In addition, Section 
936 of Dodd-Frank (2010) states that a credit rating analyst must have the necessary 
knowledge and understanding in order to perform his job competently, but Section 
936 stops short of introducing a professional oversight body (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). 
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Dodd-Frank (2010, p. 497) explicitly acknowledges the ‘systematic importance’ of 
credit ratings and states further that the activities and performances of CRA’s ‘are 
matters of national public interest’. Dodd-Frank (2010) also cites the inaccurate 
rating of structured financial products by CRA’s as a precursor for more regulation 
and accountability.   
 
Dodd-Frank (2010) aims to reduce reliance on ratings and to improve the quality of 
ratings. It seems that regulators understand that investors will continue to rely on 
credit ratings (at least for the short to medium-term). It is for this reason that it makes 
sense for regulators to improve ratings as much as possible (Hill, 2011b).  
 
Hill (2011b) asserts that removing regulatory references to ratings will not 
automatically solve the problem of over-reliance on ratings because there are no 
readily available substitutes. Darbellay and Partnoy (2012) agree that market 
participant behaviour will not change quickly because of the lack of alternatives to 
credit ratings. Flannery, Houston, and Partnoy (2010) find that credit default swap 
spreads are viable substitutes for credit ratings. On initial inspection, although they 
are not perfect, credit default spreads seem as though they are a viable substitute for 
credit ratings because they reflect information more accurately and quickly (Flannery 
et al., 2010). 
 
Dodd-Frank (2010) aims to provide oversight for CRA’s that is similar to other 
financial gatekeepers. Darbellay and Partnoy (2012, p. 15) highlight the fact that the 
Act provides regulators with ‘significant room for interpretation and implementation’. 
It seems unclear how the SEC will utilise its increased regulatory powers. It also 
appears that CRA’s will be open to legal liability claims and courts will have to 
interpret the new regulation. The impact of increased legal liability claims on CRA’s 
is uncertain (Darbellay & Partnoy, 2012).  
 
Darbellay and Partnoy (2012) assert that Dodd-Frank (2010) does not do enough to 
combat conflicts of interest which arise as a result of the issuer-pays model. It seems 
that forcing CRA’s to revert to a subscriber-pays model would have been too drastic 
a step for the U.S.A Congress. (Hill, 2011b) is critical of Dodd-Frank (2010) – it 
seems that it has not done enough to prevent future CRA failures.  
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Altman, Oncü, Richardson, Schmeits, and White (2010) warn that oversight may 
increase barriers to entry into the CRA industry, and thus undermine increased 
competition. CRA reform that raises barriers to entry is counterproductive (Darbellay 
& Partnoy, 2012). Harper (2011) argues that Dodd-Frank (2010) and CRA regulation 
should have the goal of deterrence, rather than compensation. Exposing CRA’s to 
‘crushing liability’ could severely affect financial markets – CRA’s play a central role 
in financial markets and they may stop rating complex structured securities to avoid 
liability. This would mean that investors will have access to less information for 
decision-making purposes. Harper (2011) further warns that CRA’s may relinquish 
their NRSRO statuses in order to avoid liability - it seems that current and future 
U.S.A CRA regulation will only apply to NRSRO’s. Dodd-Frank (2010) may lead to 
increased costs and decreased benefits for CRA’s because it seeks to reduce 
regulatory reliance on ratings and increase liability simultaneously. For this reason 
increased CRA liability may be ‘impractical’ (Harper, 2011, p. 1967). Harper (2011) 
concludes that Dodd-Frank (2010) will increase CRA liability and accountability. He 
suggests a tier-based liability system, depending on the nature of CRA misconduct – 
this would have the dual effect of deterring future undesirable CRA behaviour, whilst 
also protecting CRA’s from excessive liability claims.  
 
The above discussion highlights the complexity of holding CRA’s accountable for 
their ratings. Some strongly advocate liability as a deterrent to negligent or wilful 
malfeasant CRA behaviour (Cane et al., 2011; Harper, 2011). Harper (2011) 
believes that Dodd-Frank (2010) will expose CRA’s to more liability claims than were 
lodged in the past, whilst Cane et al. (2011) call for CRA’s to be subject to expert 
liability because they are so heavily relied upon by markets participants. An analysis 
of CRA accountability through the lens of Giddens’s (1990; 1991) modernity theory 
potentially illustrates a different perspective on this issue. Financial markets are 
socially constructed (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and are based on trust (Frankel, 
2002) and trustworthiness (Brescia, 2009). Following a financial crisis of the 
magnitude of 2008, regulations and liability clauses within regulations are often 
enforced to reassure non-experts that a system or industry (in this case CRA’s) still 
works (Giddens, 1991). The legitimacy and credibility of financial markets is of vital 
importance and politicians and regulators go to great lengths to maintain good 
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images (Suchman, 1995; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). Mechanisms such as 
regulation may, in fact, restore the confidence of investors, but this is not to say that 
the regulations enforced are always the most efficient and appropriate for the time or 
jurisdiction in question (Giddens, 1990, 1991). The same logic applies in a South 
African context.  
2.3.5 Regulation in South Africa: On the need for further research 
 
In South Africa, Members of Parliament drafted the Credit Rating Services Bill. The 
Bill was adopted in November 2012. This is an attempt to regulate CRA’s. The 
CRA’s seem to oppose several clauses contained in the Act. According to the Act, 
several institutions, such as municipalities, will be required to obtain credit ratings, as 
they are not allowed to invest in investments that are not ‘investment grade’. The 
CRA’s are opposed to this, as they insist that they (CRA’s) merely offer a credit 
‘opinion’. The CRA’s contend that investors should obtain further information before 
relying solely on one of their ratings to make investment decisions (Maake & Lefifi, 
2012, p. 1). 
 
The Credit Rating Services Act (2012) also exposes CRA’s to civil liability. This 
seems to be an attempt to make CRA’s accountable for negligent ratings. Some 
commentators have also called for ‘individual accountability’ – key personnel should 
be held personally responsible for negligence. The CRA’s oppose these ideas 
(Donnelly, 2012, p. 1). Before the Credit Rating Services Bill was signed into law, it 
seemed that lawmakers were willing to make some compromises but, on the whole, 
they appeared to be determined to make CRA’s more accountable for their actions 
(Donnelly, 2012). Section 2 of the Credit Rating Services Act (2012, p. 12) sets out 
five main objectives:  
 
‘(a) Ensure responsible and accountable credit rating agencies; 
(b) Protect the integrity, transparency and reliability of the credit rating process and credit 
ratings; 
(c) Improve investor protection; 
(d) Improve fairness, efficiency and transparency of financial markets; and  
(e) Reduce systemic risk.’     
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Most of these objectives are similar to those of Dodd-Frank (2010). On the issue of 
CRA liability, Section 19 of the Credit Rating Services Act (2012, p. 30) states: 
‘19 (1) A registered credit rating agency may be delictually7 liable, in respect of a credit rating 
issued or credit rating services performed in the ordinary course of business in terms of this Act, 
for any loss, damages or costs sustained as a result of such credit rating or credit rating service. 
 (2) Subsection (1) does not affect any additional or other liability of a registered credit rating 
agency to an investor or member of the public, arising from a contractual relationship or the 
application of any law.’ 
Like Dodd-Frank (2010) in the U.S.A, it seems that CRA’s will be subject to 
increased legal liability claims in South Africa. The new South African Act, however, 
does not specify that CRA’s will be subject to liability for negligent or intentional 
misconduct.  
The Credit Rating Services Act (2012) also focuses on CRA registration (similar to 
that of NRSRO’s in the U.S.A) and it imposes duties on CRA’s. These deal with 
issues of internal controls, general efficiency and administration, the appointment of 
directors, the requirement to issue an annual report (to be made available to the 
public), accounting and auditing requirements and the need for an independent 
compliance unit (to be employed by the CRA’s). The Act gives guidance on how 
CRA’s should implement ratings models and methodologies. Guidance is also 
provided on how CRA’s should go about issuing and publishing credit ratings.     
Lastly, unlike Dodd-Frank (2010), the Credit Rating Services Act (2012) does not 
address the CRA business model. The issue of CRA business model ties in with 
Dodd-Frank’s (2010) attempt to reduce conflicts of interest. Dodd-Frank (2010) 
seems to place an emphasis on resolving conflicts of interest in CRA’s. On the other 
hand, the Credit Rating Services Act (2012) mentions conflicts of interest without 
specifying how to address them. 
The similarities between South African and American CRA regulations, including the 
limitations of local regulations, raise a number of key issues. Is it possible that the 
                                                           
7
 Neethling and Potgieter (2010, p. 4) define ‘delict’ in South African law as ‘the act of a person that in 
a wrongful and culpable way causes harm to another’. 
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development of the South African regulations are a reflexive response to the 
financial crisis commencing in the U.S.A in 2007/2008? In terms of modernity theory, 
experiences learned in the world’s largest economy (a space distanciation) when 
dealing with the sub-prime mortgage crisis (a time distanciation) can impact the 
development of regulation of the South African credit rating agencies. At the same 
time, processes of mimetic isomorphism would suggest that replicating CRA 
regulation in the U.S.A becomes an important means of securing the legitimacy of 
the local capital market which is heavily dependent on international capital. Finally, 
just as the regulation of rating agencies in the U.S.A has given rise to unexpected 
consequences, the adoption of a similar regulatory framework in South Africa may 
also give rise to a host of difficulties when new laws and regulations are applied in a 
practical setting. Before dealing with each of these issues in Section 4, Section 3 
outlines the chosen method. 
3. Method 
 
This chapter explains the chosen research method. Section 3.1 introduces the 
research paradigm. The difference between positivist and interpretive research is 
discussed and the decision to use the latter approach is explained. Section 3.2 
provides a detailed description of the research method. Section 3.3 describes the 
data collection procedures. Section 3.4 outlines how the data was analysed and 
interpreted. Section 3.5 addresses validity and reliability issues. Section 3.6 outlines 
ethical considerations that were taken into account while conducting this study. 
Lastly, Section 3.7 lists the limitations of this research.   
3.1 Research paradigm 
 
There are several possible aims of an exploratory study. Firstly, it aids in gaining 
new insights into a set of phenomena. Secondly, it helps to determine future 
avenues for important research. Thirdly, it may clarify central concepts and theories. 
Lastly, it can possibly aid in developing new hypotheses about existing phenomena 
(Mouton & Marais, 1988). Creswell and Clark (2007) advocate the use of an 
exploratory qualitative study to explore a particular subject. Quantitative analysis can 
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then be used to explain and expand on the qualitative findings (Lauer & Asher, 1988; 
Leedy & Ormrod, 2010).  
When using detailed semi-structured interviews to collect data, a researcher must 
recognise that his background affects the interpretation of the data collected. 
Constructivist researchers acknowledge that their interpretation of the data is 
affected by their personal, cultural and historical experiences. An important goal of 
this approach to research is to identify and interpret the views which other people 
have about the world. This approach also strives to develop a theory or pattern of 
meaning through inquiry (Creswell & Clark, 2007; Lauer & Asher, 1988; Maroun, 
2012). This is very different from the positivist research.  
 
The positivist approach places an emphasis on being able to quantify, predict, 
control and explain a particular set of phenomena. It seems that this approach is 
tailored for the study of the natural sciences (Lee, 1991). The positivist view is 
sometimes referred to as the scientific method. The positivist approach has evolved 
and some adopt a derivative of the positivist approach known as “post-positivism’”. 
Positivists place great emphasis on numeric measures. They believe that there are 
objective laws that govern the world, and these laws must be tested or validated so 
that we can understand the world we live in. A positivist research approach seems 
simple – the researcher identifies a theory, collects data that either verifies or refutes 
the theory, and the theory is then adjusted as is necessary. Positivists believe that 
there is an ultimate truth that can be uncovered. Finally, great importance is placed 
on the objectivity of the researcher and the results. A researcher is required to 
scrutinise research results for bias in order for the research to be considered 
competent (Phillips & Burbules, 2000; Smith, 1983).  
 
Lee (1991, p. 343) summarises the positivist approach: 
‘In a nutshell, the positivist approach involves the manipulation of theoretical propositions 
using the rules of formal logic and the rules of hypothetico-deductive logic, so that the 
theoretical propositions satisfy the four requirements of falsifiability, logical consistency, 
relative explanatory power, and survival.’ 
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The social constructionist view has a different perspective of the world. It is generally 
regarded as an approach that is appropriate for qualitative research. A social 
constructivist seeks to understand the world in which he exists. Each individual 
develops subjective views of the world based on his experiences. Individuals’ views 
differ widely. This means that a researcher who adopts this approach looks for a 
wide range of complex views as opposed to narrowing ideas into a small number of 
concise categories. The researcher’s goal is to rely on the experiences of research 
participants (Berger & Luekmann, 1967; Creswell, 2009; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Creswell (2009, p. 8) states:  
 
‘The questions become broad and general so that the participants can construct the meaning 
of a situation, typically forged in discussions or interactions with other persons. The more 
open-ended the questioning, the better, as the researcher listens carefully to what people say 
or do in their life settings.’ 
 
Positivist researchers strive for objectivity when doing research (Walsh & Stewart, 
1993). These researchers believe that it is imperative to eliminate any preconceived 
notions, biases, prejudices and perceptions that they have. By eliminating 
subjectivity, these researchers hope to discover ‘ultimate truth’. In contrast, many 
qualitative researchers contend that using such an objective approach to study 
human behaviour may not be desirable or possible (Creswell, 2009; Eisner, 1991). 
Qualitative research emphasises the role of the researcher. The researcher is an 
integral part in the qualitative research process. The researcher’s ability in analysing 
and interpreting is imperative for understanding the social phenomena in question. A 
goal of qualitative research is to reveal multiple differing perspectives of the same 
phenomenon (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010).   
Peshkin (1988, p. 418) further states:  
‘Those who turn to qualitative inquiry deny neither the utility nor the necessity of finding 
regularities and of making generalizations and predictions. However, they are attracted more 
to a form of investigation that, by considering the extraordinary variability of things, is replete 
with-and does not shrink from exploring-ambiguity. By taste, talent, and personality, they are 
disposed to use the means of qualitative inquiry. These means allow them to bring to bear all 
the potency for learning contained in the full range of human senses.’ 
36 | P a g e  
 
As a result, qualitative studies do not define the phenomenon under investigation 
with an aim to testing a given set of hypotheses. Instead, a more exploratory 
approach is followed where the research uses a broader, less rigid means of 
collecting and analysing data. In particular, data collection and analysis take place 
continuously to allow for broader (and possibly less structured) research problems to 
be examined in detail (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). 
3.2 Research method 
 
This research report adopts a social constructivist (or interpretive) worldview 
(Creswell, 2009). A qualitative design, using detailed interviews, is appropriate, given 
the exploratory nature of this study and the absence of direct prior research (Lauer & 
Asher, 1988; Mouton & Marais, 1988). The aim of this report is not to validate or 
refute a specific theory or objective state of reality. Instead, this report uses detailed 
interviews to explore and understand the differing perceptions and views of a sample 
of industry experts8 on the regulation of CRA’s in South Africa.  
The researcher plays an important role in the qualitative research process. This type 
of research focuses on revealing complexities and places an emphasis on 
uncovering the deeper meanings perceived by individuals in particular issues 
(Creswell, 2009). Most qualitative approaches have two things in common: first, they 
focus on the “real world” – a set of phenomena is observed in their natural settings. 
Second, the phenomena are studied in their complexity. The aim of this qualitative 
research is not to simplify what has been examined. In this case, the researcher 
recognised that CRA regulation is complex. It is for this reason that this qualitative 
study endeavours to reveal the complexities of the issues surrounding CRA’s and 
the regulation thereof in South Africa (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010).  
It is imperative to acknowledge the role of the researcher in a qualitative study. The 
researcher was the interviewer and was exposed to the differing opinions of the 
participants. While an element of inherent bias exists in a qualitative approach, the 
total elimination of the researcher’s influence on the study was impossible 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1989). The goal of qualitative research is, however, to gain 
                                                           
8
 The terms experts, interviewees, participants and respondents are used interchangeably throughout 
this research report. 
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an understanding of the researcher’s role and to use it productively, as opposed to 
eliminating the researcher’s influence (Maxwell, 1998).   
 
With this in mind, the researcher had to decide on the best method of data collection. 
The use of a questionnaire or survey was considered. Questionnaires can be easily 
distributed to a large number of participants. The findings from questionnaires are 
often easy to quantify or generalise into rigid categories. The difficulty with using a 
questionnaire is gathering data in sufficient detail to shed light on the phenomenon 
under review (Creswell, 2009). Further, it is difficult to prove that the respondents 
have taken the questionnaire seriously and filled it out accurately (Rowley, 2012). It 
is for this reason that detailed interviews were used instead of a questionnaire. 
 
Before having chosen to conduct interviews, the researcher was aware that 
interviews are time-consuming and time constraints can often affect the number of 
interviews to be conducted. A key advantage that an interview has over a 
questionnaire is that a purposeful sampling method can be applied. The researcher 
is able to choose an interviewee who has a good knowledge of the research topic 
(Creswell, 2009). In the case of a questionnaire, it is not always clear that the 
respondents have a high level of understanding of the research topic under review 
(Rowley, 2012). 
Structured interviews seem similar to questionnaires, except that they guarantee a 
response. An unstructured interview can be used as an alternative. An unstructured 
interview often requires a researcher with experience and it often generates 
transcripts that are vastly different from one other and this makes them difficult to 
compare (Rowley, 2012). 
 
A medium between structured and unstructured interviews is the semi-structured 
interview. This research study utilised a semi-structured interview approach. This 
was useful because the research objective focuses on gaining a deeper 
understanding of ‘experiences, opinions, attitudes, values and processes’ (Rowley, 
2012, p. 262).  
The interview agenda was derived after careful consideration of the main themes 
and ideas which emerged from the literature review (Creswell, 2009; Jacob & 
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Furgerson, 2012). These included the role and importance of regulation, key features 
of successful regulation, issues of trust, credibility and power, the regulator’s role in 
the market, and the 2007/2008 financial crisis, with a specific focus on CRA’s 
(Appendix 1). 
The order of the interview questions was considered carefully – the questions led the 
interviews through a logical sequence which, in turn, led to a natural conclusion. The 
interview questions were non-leading and open-ended. Vague questions or 
questions which were too general were avoided. Lastly, invasive questions and 
questions that included two questions in one were also avoided (Rowley, 2012). The 
interview questions ensured that the same general topics and areas were discussed 
by each respondent. The interviews maintained a level of focus and also gave the 
respondents a level of flexibility to expand on ideas as they wished (Kvale, 1996, 
2008; Turner, 2010). Lastly, the interview agenda was also piloted with two experts 
in Johannesburg. This was followed by a detailed peer debriefing with two lecturers 
at the University of Witwatersrand to make sure that the interview agenda was 
sound9. 
3.3 Data collection 
 
Rowley (2012) suggests that it is appropriate to conduct between six and eight 
interviews of approximately an hour in length for such a study. Rowley (2012) further 
states that the sample of interview participants must include people with different 
backgrounds, roles, experience and other possible sources of variability to help gain 
a better understanding of the research problem and question.  
The sample size for this study was thirteen10. Experts on CRA’s, regulation and law 
were interviewed (Appendix 2 details the experience and background of the 
respondents). The researcher conducted in-depth interviews between September 
2012 and December 2013, each of which lasted between 45 and 120 minutes 
(Maroun & Solomon, 2013; Rowley, 2012). The small sample size (compared with 
                                                           
9
 The interview agenda was also presented at the Southern African Accounting Association (SAAA) 
Biennial Conference in Somerset West in June 2013. 
10
 Small sample sizes are an inherent characteristic of qualitative research (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010; 
Rowley, 2012). Examples of studies that have used small sample sizes include O’Dwyer et al. (2011), 
Maroun and Solomon (2013) and Hammond, Clayton, and Arnold (2012). 
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quantitative studies) is justified by the exploratory nature of this study. The main aim 
of such a study is to explore the differing perceptions and opinions of the interview 
participants (Creswell & Clark, 2007). The result of such an approach is a more 
extensive and insightful data collection process than a positive research study 
(Maroun, 2012). Consequently, this report utilised a sample size similar to studies by 
Maroun and Solomon (2013) and O’Dwyer et al. (2011).  
The researcher contacted the interviewees (by phone or electronic mail) in order to 
find suitable times to conduct the interviews. Twelve interviews were conducted in 
Johannesburg, South Africa (either telephonically or in person), while one interview 
was conducted telephonically with a former South African citizen who now resides in 
Australia.  
Purposeful selection of interviewees ensured that the researcher could concentrate 
on the views of only informed participants (Creswell, 2009; Patton, 1990).  Purposive 
sampling poses the risk of reporting biased results. This method of sampling, 
however, also ensures high quality detailed findings that are collected from 
interviews with informed and knowledgeable participants. This was necessary due to 
the highly technical nature of this research (Creswell, 2009, 2012).11  
The exploratory nature of this study dictated that the interviews conducted were as 
open as possible in order to elicit candid opinions from the interviewees. Although 
the interviews were unrestrictive, a semi-structured approach was adopted to ensure 
that the interviews did not veer off topic. The researcher gave a brief outline of the 
main topics discussed in the literature review, based on prior research. The 
interviews were unrestrictive and the interviewees were encouraged to expand on 
their thoughts and opinions as much as possible. The aim of the interviews was to 
provide an open forum for the expression of ideas, opinions and perspectives. 
Interviewees were encouraged to speak freely with minimum interruption by the 
researcher. Interviewees were asked to clarify points where there are possible 
ambiguities to ensure the quality of the findings. The interview questions (Appendix 
                                                           
11
 It should be noted that sampling decisions should not be made in isolation from the rest of the 
research design. Some of the things to take into account include the researcher’s relationship with the 
interviewees, feasibility of data collection and analysis, as well as validity and reliability concerns 
(Maxwell, 1998). 
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1) were non-leading and the researcher avoided asking invasive questions (adapted 
from Creswell, 2009; Leedy & Ormrod, 2010; Maroun & Solomon, 2013).  
The interviews were recorded using two digital recorders and one audiotape 
recorder. The digital recordings were backed up to a laptop and an external hard 
drive as soon as the interviews were completed. This was done to protect against 
the potential loss of data. The researcher also took basic notes during the interviews. 
Taking notes acted as a safeguard in the event that an interview recording was 
unclear or lost. The handwritten notes also aided in the process of analysing the 
interview contents. Creswell (2009) suggests that handwritten notes are taken in 
case recording equipment fails. The interviews were transcribed soon after the 
interviews were conducted and the transcriptions were then ready for analysis. 
3.4 Data analysis and interpretation 
 
The data analysis and data interpretation stages in a qualitative study are very 
closely linked and carried out by the researcher. The ‘data analysis spiral’ was used 
as a tool to analyse data in this study. The data analysis spiral can be used to 
analyse a wide range of qualitative studies (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010).  
The spiral method consists of four main steps: organisation, perusal, classification 
and synthesis. Organising the data was done by creating a computer database. 
Once this was done, the large units of data were broken down into smaller units. 
This made the data analysis process more manageable. The perusal step was very 
time consuming. The researcher scrutinised all the data several times in order to 
gain a full understanding of what the data contained. It is during this step that the 
researcher began to categorise the data broadly, and where initial interpretation took 
place. The classification step of this process is where the data was formally grouped 
into categories or themes. This step also entailed finding the true meaning of the 
data. The last step in this process involved synthesising the data. The data was 
summarised and initial notes on the primary themes in the interview recordings - and 
main arguments for and against the regulation of CRA’s in South Africa - were made. 
This approach ensured that the researcher conducted a thorough analysis of the 
data collected. By the end of this process the researcher was familiar with all the 
detail contained in the data collected (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010).    
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Coding the data took place at this of the qualitative research study. ‘Coding’ simply 
means that the researcher organised the data into manageable sections before 
interpretation took place. Coding took place during the first step of the data analysis 
spiral. The interview transcripts were coded according the themes that emerged from 
the interviews. Predetermined codes were not used. The researcher highlighted the 
main themes that emerged from the interviews and each theme was highlighted in a 
different colour. The coding process was completed using Microsoft Word. Once the 
main themes were generated, each theme was copied into a new Word document. 
The main themes that emerged from the coding process are the themes presented in 
the findings Section of this report (Creswell, 2009; Maroun & Solomon, 2013).  
Prior literature on CRA’s and CRA regulation was used to ground the interpretation 
and findings. The findings of this report were compared with prior literature and 
theories. This either showed that the findings confirmed or challenged the main 
themes or concepts identified in the prior research (Creswell, 2009).   
Lastly, the interpretation of data in a qualitative study is influenced by the 
researcher’s biases to some extent. This is unavoidable as the researcher is indeed 
an ‘instrument’ in this research approach. To ensure high quality findings, thirteen 
interviews were conducted to ensure that a wide range of varying perspectives were 
sought. Furthermore, the researcher made a concerted effort to find evidence to 
contradict the findings (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). The researcher also guarded 
against excessive interpretation, as this poses a threat to the findings of a qualitative 
study (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). 
3.5 Validity and reliability 
 
It should be noted that although the researcher was heavily involved in both data 
collection and analysis phases, this was not a threat to the validity or reliability of this 
qualitative study. Rather, this is an inherent characteristic of such research (Creswell 
& Clark, 2007). 
Validity and reliability are key aspects of qualitative research that require attention 
(Creswell, 2009). Qualitative validity and reliability differ from their quantitative 
equivalents. In the qualitative research context, reliability is an indication that the 
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researcher’s approach is consistent across different projects. Qualitative validity 
refers to the accuracy of a researcher’s findings based on the procedures employed 
(Gibbs, 2008).  
The researcher employed two main procedures to ensure reliability. First, the 
interview transcripts were thoroughly examined several times to ensure that no 
obvious mistakes were made during transcription. Second, the definitions and 
meanings of codes were constantly scrutinised by comparing the collected data with 
the assigned codes (Gibbs, 2008). 
The researcher employed four main strategies to provide reasonable assurance with 
regard to the validity of this study. First, a ‘member checking’ technique was used to 
determine the accuracy of the qualitative findings. This was done by sending 
transcripts or sections of the written report to the interviewees to check that data was 
captured accurately (Creswell & Miller, 2000). Second, the researcher clarified the 
inherent bias that exists in a qualitative study (Creswell, 2009). Third, peer debriefing 
was used to enhance the accuracy of this study (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). The 
peer debriefing process involved locating a peer to review and offer interpretations 
regarding the study. Four, an independent reviewer was used to review this entire 
research project. This independent reviewer was not familiar with the research 
project and was able to provide objective assessments about the project as a whole 
(Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Miller, 2000).  
Other steps that enhanced the validity of this study include the use of purposive 
sampling (interviewing experienced and knowledgeable participants), the piloting of 
the interview agenda12  and the grounding of interview findings in prior literature 
(Creswell, 2009; Rowley, 2012). Lastly, the interviews were semi-structured. This 
was to ensure a detailed examination of the subject matter, while still retaining focus 
on the research objective. Research ethics (as discussed below), also formed part of 
the validity checks in this study (Holland, 2005; Maroun & Solomon, 2013; O’Dwyer 
et al., 2011). 
 
                                                           
12
 The interview agenda was piloted with two experts in Johannesburg and no issues were noted. 
Each pilot interview lasted forty five minutes on average. 
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3.6 Ethical considerations 
 
A researcher has to anticipate ethical issues when embarking on a research project 
(Creswell, 2009). The highest level of research ethics was maintained throughout 
this study.  
The purpose of this study was made clear to the interview participants from the 
outset, and in particular, that the research was carried out for academic purposes 
only. The researcher further clarified that the culmination of the findings in a research 
report would form part of the researcher’s Master’s degree (Creswell, 2009).  
The researcher took several ethical considerations into account during the data 
collection process. Interviewees who agree to be recorded were assured that no-one 
would have access to the recordings, besides the researcher. It was also confirmed 
that their anonymity would be protected. No names, professions or positions of 
interviewees are mentioned in this report (Creswell, 2009).  
The data collected from the interviews will be kept by the researcher and only the 
researcher has access to the recordings. The data will be discarded after a 
reasonable amount of time and will not be made publicly available. The interview 
agenda was piloted and ethical clearance was granted by the School of Accountancy 
for the interview agenda. The researcher did not suppress, falsify or invent findings 
to meet a specific agenda. The data collected was analysed and interpreted in line 
with accepted qualitative research procedures. All the findings were presented in a 
non-biased fashion (taking into account the inherent limitations of such a study, as 
explained above) (adapted from Creswell, 2009). 
3.7 Limitations 
 
Despite the safeguards that were put in place to ensure validity and reliability, a 
number of inherent limitations should be noted: 
• There is a risk that interviewees provided rehearsed responses or responses 
that do not necessarily reflect their point of view. This may be due to pressure 
from employers. The interviewees may have felt compelled to give responses 
that are perceived as politically correct (see Creswell, 2009; Holland, 2005).  
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• As mentioned above, the researcher is an integral part of the data collection 
process when interviews are conducted. This may imply that the results from 
this study may not necessarily be conducive to generalisation or reproduction, 
as is the aim with positivist research studies (Alvesson, 2003). 
• Interviews often provide highly exploratory results that are context-specific. 
This can produce results that are highly technical and some non-experts may 
find it difficult to interpret such findings. 
3.8 Summary 
 
In summary, the aim of this research is not to reveal an ultimate ‘truth’. It is for this 
reason that a qualitative research design was utilised to provide perspective on CRA 
regulation in South Africa. Detailed semi-structured interviews allowed respondents 
the opportunity to express their views and opinions on the decision to regulate CRA’s 
in South Africa. An element of bias may be apparent from the use of purposive 
sampling; however, this technique was used in order to ensure that well-informed 
and expert individuals participated, adding to the quality of the findings. As discussed 
above, the researcher employed many validity and reliability checks to ensure the 
quality of the findings. The data was also meticulously coded and the interpretation 
of interview findings was grounded in prior literature. The detailed findings are 
presented in Section 4 below.  
4. Findings 
4.1 Regulation legitimises the capital system 
4.1.1 The role of CRA regulation in South Africa 
 
South Africa is viewed by many market participants as a very restrictive country in 
which to do business due to its ‘excessive regulation’ (R10). Walmart’s acquisition of 
Massmart is cited as an ‘embarrassing’ (R1) and ‘scandalous’ (R10) example of the 
growing perception abroad of the difficulties of doing business in South Africa due to 
government interference and regulation. 
‘South Africa has the reputation of being the most regulated country, not just in Africa, but in 
most of the world. It’s difficult to do anything, despite what the DTI [Department of Trade and 
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Industry] keeps telling you...Doing business for some investing in South Africa is a bit of a 
nightmare. Now there’s lots of regulation and lots of it doesn’t make any sense to people but 
it’s there, it’s part and parcel of it. So the South African view of life is if it moves regulate it, if it 
doesn’t, regulate it’ (R7). 
 ‘...as you’re probably aware, one of the things that we rated quite negatively on in the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness survey, is government intervention and fiddling 
around with regulations and how difficult it is to actually do business. (R1)’ 
On the decision to regulate CRA’s, the Financial Services Board (FSB) (2013, p. 
131) states: 
‘The Act gives effect to the G20 [The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors] requirement of creating a globally consistent regulatory framework for CRA’s, as 
well as complying with the IOSCO [International Organisation of Securities Commissions] 
principle that CRA’s should be subject to adequate levels of oversight. The principle requires 
that this be done via a regulatory system that ensures that credit rating agencies...are subject 
to registration and ongoing supervision.’ 
There was a mixed reaction to the decision to regulate CRA’s in South Africa. One 
school of thought supports the introduction of South African CRA regulation. Those 
that are in favour of the new South African CRA regulation believe that CRA’s must 
be regulated by government because they perform a vital public interest role. 
Investors make important decisions based on credit ratings and, therefore, CRA’s 
should be subject to a high level of scrutiny by a government regulator. There is also 
the belief that new CRA regulation aims to engender more responsible behaviour 
from CRA’s, as opposed to restricting or hampering their activities (R3; R5; R9; R11; 
R12). 
‘There is third party reliance...they perform a public function. People make decisions based on 
them. They must be regulated and there shouldn’t be a choice. The fact that people rely on 
them means that they can’t just do what they want - there must be rules, standards, 
enforcement, regulation...at least the same type of regulation as auditors due to the reliance 
[placed on CRA’s]’ (R9).  
‘The new regulation is not telling them how to do their job. Regulators want CRA’s to adhere 
to their own methodologies and to make sure that the methods that they use are robust 
enough to keep up with change’ (R2).  
Furthermore, introducing CRA regulation during a relatively stable economic period 
is a good sign – ‘it seems like a proactive step...we now have the luxury of 
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introducing and implementing it slowly and seeing what works and what doesn’t 
work’ (R8). South Africa is often considered ‘more visionary in terms of regulation’. 
Regulators in South Africa are renowned for taking proactive steps to protect the 
economy, as opposed to those in the U.S.A, who have been accused of introducing 
reactive regulations as a knee-jerk reaction to certain crises. The National Credit Act 
(2005)13 and Section 9014 of the Companies Act (2008)15 are good examples of 
effective and forward-looking regulation in South Africa (R8; R9; R11; R12).   
Those who are supportive of South Africa’s regulatory environment also suggest that 
South Africa was shielded from the impact of the 2008 crisis as a result of ‘our world 
class’ (R9) government regulation. The fact that South Africa was only affected by 
‘the spill over of the crisis’ proves that strong regulation can help a country to avoid 
serious financial crises (R9). Strong auditing, banking and credit (National Credit Act 
(2005)) regulation, as well as the Companies Act (2008), are cited as the main 
reasons for South Africa not being as harshly affected as many other countries by 
the 2008 global financial crisis. Exchange controls did play a role, but the situation 
would not have been very different had exchange controls not been in place (R9; 
R11; R12).      
‘Maybe it [the 2008 crisis] proves that a heavier hand with clear lines on rules and regulations 
helps when things go wrong. It protected them in bad times - that’s the reason for regulation, 
to manage risk...They could argue that they missed out on the good times, making money, 
but that’s not the point...it cuts the upside, but limits the downside when things go wrong’ 
(R9).  
The other school of thought is more cynical regarding the introduction of the new 
regulation. There is a claim that South African regulators have bowed to international 
pressure by introducing the new Act. It is not immediately apparent that South Africa 
requires CRA regulation, especially due to the small size of the South African credit 
rating market. It is also claimed that a proliferation of regulation is a natural result of 
the 2008 financial crisis (R1; R4; R6; R7; R8; R10). Similar to the arguments made 
                                                           
13
 The National Credit Act (2005) is outside the scope of this research. 
14
 Section 90 deals with provisions relating to auditors who are engaged to perform a statutory audit 
for a company. 
15
 The Companies "Companies Act No. 71" 2008) is outside the scope of this research. 
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by Hancher and Moran (1989) and Malsch and Gendron (2011), several of the 
respondents pointed out that:  
‘It is important to understand the driving force of CRA regulation at the moment...IOSCO is 
driving it. South Africa is an executive committee member of IOSCO, therefore, there is 
political pressure to abide by IOSCO recommendations. IOSCO is undoubtedly succeeding in 
their mission...the EU [European Union], Dodd-Frank, South Africa are all very similar or the 
same. The South African Act is very similar to the IOSCO code...the driving force and has 
been absolutely successful’ (R4). 
‘Over-regulation always seems to result from an event, over-regulation in one direction or the 
other, so it’s the pendulum of regulation...immediately after the crash the pendulum was 
swinging way out to over-regulation and then it’s coming back and they don’t know quite 
where it is at the moment, but it will inevitably come to under-regulation again and then 
something else will happen and so we go backwards and forwards. One thing that I believe 
would not have changed is if there was more regulation at the time, it wouldn’t have made any 
difference’ (R7). 
The role of modernity theory is apparent here. The fallout from the 2008 financial 
crisis highlights a space and time distanciation. Lessons learned in other jurisdictions 
and emerging expectations (such as the IOSCO and other regulatory frameworks) 
have eventually led to new CRA regulation in South Africa (space distanciation). The 
‘pendulum of regulation’ also underlines a time distanciation. In good economic 
times, we tend towards under-regulation, but in difficult economic conditions, 
markets become over-regulated in order to quell undesirable behaviour and restore 
confidence in the capital system (R1; R4; R7).  
As discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, periods of modernity are also characterised by 
the key role played by large institutions in capital markets. For these institutions to 
function, maintaining a sense of legitimacy or credibility is paramount, something 
which several interviewees confirmed when exploring the role of regulation of the 
CRA’s.  
A key theme emerging from the detailed interviews was the need for South Africa to 
protect its international reputation in order to attract foreign investment. The principle 
of regulating CRA’s is important ‘because it keeps up the perception of the South 
African economy’ (R9). It seems that maintaining the perception of a stable and well-
regulated economy is essential in this regard (R1; R4; R5; R7; R8; R9). In other 
48 | P a g e  
 
words, forces of mimetic isomorphism mean that South African regulators have, to a 
great degree, replicated or aligned themselves with regulation from other 
jurisdictions to gain credibility and trust in the South African economy. The FSB 
(2013, p. 131) states: 
‘As an important African economic powerhouse and a continuing participant in international 
debt capital markets, it is important for South Africa to be seen as leading the way in 
complying with these requirements.’ 
 
It appears that the onus is placed on regulators to ensure that a country is attractive 
to foreign investors. As explained by one respondent, it’s the ‘regulator’s job to get 
foreign investment’ (R8). Firstly, new regulation should be publicised in such a way 
that a jurisdiction’s appearance is enhanced or maintained. Secondly, regulators 
should endeavour to introduce regulation that offers more advantages than rival 
jurisdictions’ regulations, in order to compete for foreign investment (R1; R4; R5; R7; 
R8). These views highlight the important role which regulation plays in legitimising 
the capital system. Introducing regulation (especially in the aftermath of a severe 
financial crisis) seemingly adds credibility to governments and regulators, and 
creates the perception of an investor-friendly economy (albeit illusionary at times) 
(R1; R4; R5; R7; R8). Regulators often rationalise certain regulations or regulatory 
models by creating the impression that new regulation is necessary and adds value 
to the market, even if this is not always the case (Black, 2010; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 
2004).         
‘Why are we regulating CRA’s? We’re competing with other developing countries. Nigeria is a 
big competitor, China too. We have to be first, the credibility of our market is really important 
to attract investment. We have to have the rules before others...otherwise we won’t build 
confidence in our market....It’s the same as adopting IFRS [International Financial Reporting 
Standards] a few years back, and the criticism that came with that’ (R8). 
The effect of the financial crisis on South Africa is also relevant. Some respondents 
claimed that the only reason that South Africa did not feel the full force of the crisis 
was strong exchange controls. South African banks were not allowed to ‘gamble’ and 
buy complex financial products that eventually triggered the crisis. South African 
banks with international arms operating abroad were ‘burned’ (R8). To claim that 
good banking and credit regulation was the reason for South Africa being shielded 
from the full force of the 2007/2008 crisis is ‘rubbish’ (R8).     
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‘...everybody was at risk, apart from the few of us in the Southern Hemisphere. We weren’t at 
risk only because exchange controls didn’t permit South African banks to get into this 
space...so for once, exchange control had a beneficial impact on the banks of the country - so 
they’re now rated as the best in the world! It’s bizarre!’ (R7).  
The importance of CRA regulation is not immediately apparent to this interviewee. 
Some experts thought that the new regulation will improve the way CRA’s operate. 
The overriding view, however, is that the purpose of new regulation is to create the 
appearance of a strong and active regulator and government. Governments want to 
be seen as strongly reacting to financial crises in order to garner confidence in their 
respective markets (R1; R3; R4; R7; R8; R10). This finding echoes Giddens’s (1990, 
1991) views on periods of late modernity. The functioning of mechanisms of 
modernity, in this case the CRA’s, relies heavily on trust, blind faith or simply the 
assumption that the system works. Regulation gives people the basis for making 
those assumptions rational. Ironically, however, the reason for the regulations being 
there in the first place is that trust itself is no longer adequate.  
As discussed above, several respondents felt that replicating the move for more 
regulation of the CRA’s was important for securing the confidence of non-expert 
users in the rating agencies (an example of an expert system, as discussed in 
Section 2.2). What some interviewees suggest is that it is more of a symbolic display 
than an example of substantive reform to the South African credit rating industry. In 
other words, what is equally relevant for the functioning of the expert system is the 
promotion of the myth that the system works and the ability of non-experts to 
overlook the tension between trust in the capital system and the need for CRA 
regulation (Giddens, 1991).  
There is a resulting implication that the introduction of a new regulation is a 
mechanism that governments use for their self-interest. As discussed in Section 2.2, 
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004) claim that governments go to great lengths to protect 
their respective economies because, in essence, a government’s existence is 
inextricably tied to its capital system. In this light, regulation is often used as a 
political strategy, as highlighted by one interviewee:  
‘The credibility of our market is really important because we’re really trying to attract 
investment. So, if we’re not pro-active and the first [to introduce CRA regulation], and if we 
don’t have the best rules, we can’t build that confidence in our market, and, therefore, 
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investors will go elsewhere. It [marketing our regulation well] is really important. That’s one of 
the benefits, one of the upsides of South Africa - we are seen to have well regulated markets 
and good legislation. That [perception] helps us’ (R8).    
On one hand, the regulation has a functional role to play: it improves the operation of 
CRA’s. On the other hand, the relevance of credibility and impression management 
lies at the heart of periods of late modernity (Giddens, 1990) and means that CRA 
regulation could  be used to create the appearance of a rational expert system to 
maintain confidence in the capital markets on which governments are so heavily 
dependent (see Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). What needs to be examined in more 
detail is the nature of regulation itself – should we rely on a self-regulatory system or 
an arms-length independent one? This question is analysed in the subsection below. 
4.1.2 Regulatory model – self-regulation or independent government regulation 
 
The role CRA’s played, leading up to the crisis inevitably led to regulation (R1; R2; 
R3; R6; R8; R9; R10). Historically, CRA’s were self-regulated to some degree or 
even unregulated, as discussed in Section 2.3 (R2; R3; R4; R6).   
Self-regulation has been heavily criticised in recent years. Self-regulation often 
resulted in the self-interest of the regulated entities being prioritised over the public 
interest (R7; R8). The failure of self-regulation models in many industries is cited as 
the reason why government regulation is necessary (Stiglitz, 2009). Internationally, 
therefore, the trend in regulation has moved away from self-regulation towards 
independent government regulation. ‘Government regulation is there to protect the 
public’ (R12). A recent World Bank report, for example, has called for accountants in 
South Africa to be regulated by a government or independent body (South Africa 
Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes Accounting and Auditing, 2013) 
and tax practitioners will now be regulated by the South African Revenue Service 
(SARS) (R8; R9; R11; R12). With self-regulation of these industries attracting 
considerable criticism due to self-interest threats, the continued functioning of the 
respective expert systems necessitates an increased use of external regulation 
(Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). The same is true for the CRA’s (R1; R2; R8; R9; R11).   
‘Trust is a consideration, but for a long time businesses were free to do what they liked – 
there was a lot of self-regulation and now the pendulum has swung...Self-regulation can be 
scary. With the freedom of self-regulation there was a lot of abuse. The pendulum has swung 
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past the point where we’ll ever go back to self-regulation...Now regulators are trying to find a 
middle ground. Now there will always be some level of government regulation, because self-
regulation was so disastrous’ (R8).    
‘Self-regulation is not something we can go back to. It’s proven not to work’ (R9).  
CRA’s have traditionally been left to self-regulate. The notoriety they earned for their 
role in the 2008 financial crisis meant that they could no longer escape some degree 
of government scrutiny. Despite the fact that they were not regulated by 
governments in the past, there was a feeling that CRA’s were scrupulous when it 
came to  ratings, mainly due to the reputation risk associated with issuing an 
incorrect rating (R1; R4; R5; R6; R8). Respondents went on to explain, however, that 
the financial crisis highlighted potential weaknesses in the existing self-regulatory 
model and raised some concerns about the possibility of a similar rating scandal 
affecting South Africa. In response, there is a call for CRA’s to be regulated by way 
of independent government regulation to ensure that errors of the past (and those in 
other jurisdictions) are not repeated locally (R2; R3; R4; R8; R9). 
In other words, outsiders, or non-experts, operate on the good faith assumption that 
the expert system (the credit rating industry) is working as it ought to. The 2008 crisis 
shook confidence in the system and led to a realisation that self-regulation has 
discernible flaws. The way in which governments respond to preserve the functioning 
of the system is to introduce additional regulation (Giddens, 1990, 1991; Malsch & 
Gendron, 2011; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004).  
‘Historically, they did what they wanted, they self-regulated. We’ve learned from other 
professions, self-regulation doesn’t work. I look at the legal profession, the accounting 
profession throughout, investment banking and commercial banking.  We know self-regulation 
is a disaster. If you want to keep people on straight and narrows, you have to have a fear…a 
public body, a government appointed regulator to put fear in the organisation that if they don’t 
do things right, they are going to lose their licence outright. I’m a big believer in it, but it needs 
proper administration’ (R2). 
‘They [CRA’s] should be regulated by the government. They should also have to be registered 
with a suitable body with a code of ethics and everything that surrounds a profession. Credit 
rating analysts at CRA’s should have to pass exams like accountants, auditors, actuaries and 
lawyers. The reason I say this is because up until now, there has been no control over how 
they come to their ratings’ (R3). 
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The above comments should not be construed as implying that interviewees 
unanimously agreed with the regulatory model for CRA’s. The recent decision by 
governments and regulators around the world (including South Africa) to regulate 
CRA’s by way of independent government regulation has been questioned on the 
grounds that: 
‘...to introduce a statutory body, I think there needs to have been a progression beforehand 
which says that the industry or the profession has had self-regulation but it’s now reached a 
level where its self-regulation is actually not in the public interest, it’s more in the interest of 
those who are already in the inside...So regulation I think may be perceived as public policy 
but I don’t think it’s supportable unless there’s been a market-driven need for it in the first 
place’ (R7). 
The Credit Rating Services Act (2012) is the first CRA regulation in South Africa. 
There is an implication that the decision to regulate CRA’s by way of government 
regulation was perhaps a ‘knee-jerk’ (R7) reaction to the crisis (especially given the 
size of the CRA market in South Africa). It is questionable whether there is a local 
market-driven need to regulate CRA’s (R7).  
From a slightly different perspective, some experts are sceptical about government’s 
involvement in regulating CRA’s. One respondent went as far as to say that 
government’s contribution should be ‘microscopic’ because ‘there is much 
bureaucracy and red tape to contend with when government gets involved in the 
regulation process’ (R7). Government was also accused of being inefficient, as 
opposed to its private sector counterparts (R1; R6; R7; R10). Lastly, there are some 
who do not believe that government-backed CRA regulation is necessarily in the 
public’s best interest. Rather, the South African government is merely conforming to 
international trends and protecting itself and the South African economy (as 
discussed in Section 4.1.1) (R1; R6; R7; R10).  
In terms of modernity theory, it does not matter if the relevant controls and 
regulations in place are the most efficient. What is most important is the ability of 
these mechanisms to reassure non-experts that these systems work. Consequently, 
those opposed to additional regulation, argue that concerns about the efficiency of 
regulatory measures – and the ability of the State actually to enforce the regulations 
– take second place to the symbolic value of the new CRA laws. ‘Symbolic’ should 
not, however, be read as ‘less relevant’ (Giddens, 1991; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004).  
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Interestingly, those who were critical or sceptical of government involvement in 
regulating CRA’s accepted that it was an inevitable outcome of the financial crisis. In 
particular, they stopped short of concluding that government regulation was 
completely unnecessary. As predicted by modernity theory, with the financial crisis 
shaking confidence in the capital system, at least some response is needed to 
preserve the confidence of outsiders in the expert system (Section 2.1). In this 
context, almost all respondents were willing to compromise on a ‘hybrid’ (R8) 
regulatory model which includes elements of both self- and government-backed 
regulation. An industry should have its own rules and standards and it should deal 
with issues as they arise (R1; R5), but an element of government regulation is 
imperative when there is non-compliance. Government should be able to step in and 
deal with serious breaches of rules or standards (R1; R5; R6; R8; R10).  
‘A hybrid of self-regulation and government is best. The industries where regulation works 
best is where there is a good mix...a combination is ideal’ (R8). 
‘I suppose inherently I’m a free marketeer, so government regulation is unwarranted 
inefficient bureaucratic interference, which is perhaps a little bit harsh, but it tends to come 
down that way very often. But self-regulation is also a weakness, because the people who 
are doing the regulation have a vested interest and are not necessarily seen to be acting 
neutrally, even if in their best endeavours they are doing. So if there’s a possibility of a 
combination of the two, I think that would be desirable’ (R1, emphasis added).   
This Section has dealt with the nature or type of regulatory system that may be able 
to regulate CRA’s effectively. A discussion of CRA accountability follows in the next 
subsection. Accountability is another key factor which contributes to stakeholders 
placing their confidence in the functioning of CRA’s. In the institutionalised 
environment characterising modernity (Giddens, 1991), CRA’s should be able to 
claim credit for their successes but, at the same time, should be held responsible for 
their errors. This discussion is expanded below.  
4.1.3 CRA accountability 
 
A theme which emerged during the detailed interviews is the importance of CRA 
accountability. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, regulators have sought to 
enhance CRA accountability in order to ensure that they do not make the same 
errors (R2; R3; R4; R6; R8; R9). As will be discussed below in Section 4.2.2, the 
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failures of gatekeepers, such as CRA’s, has shifted a degree of responsibility 
(perhaps unintentionally) onto investors. Investors must now be more cautious when 
assessing gatekeeper opinions (R4; R6; R10). 
The Credit Rating Services Act (2012) has had the following effect: Investors will 
have to be more cautious of whom they rely on for information and CRA’s will be 
able to avoid responsibility for their errors more easily. The reason for this is that the 
fact that regulation has been introduced should be a warning to investors that CRA’s 
should not be blindly relied on. The legal liability clauses in the South African 
regulation could be part of the process of replicating CRA regulation in the U.S.A and 
other jurisdictions around the world (Section 4.1.1). The fact that investors will carry 
an increased burden is possibly an unforeseen consequence of regulation (R4; R5; 
R6). Notwithstanding the consequences of the new CRA regulation, all interviewees 
agreed with Manns (2009): CRA’s must be accountable for their actions, and part of 
the discussion on accountability includes liability for CRA’s when they make errors. 
As discussed in Section 2.3.5, Section 19 of the Credit Rating Services Act (2012), 
CRA’s in South Africa may be held delictually liable in certain instances. One of the 
respondents stated that new CRA regulation, worldwide, ‘is trying to suppress 
overreliance on ratings and shift more responsibility onto investors’. This is a key 
point to consider with regard to CRA liability (R2). In fact, investors might find it hard 
to hold CRA’s liable if they (investors) have to shoulder more responsibility for their 
investment decisions and their use of ratings (R2; R4; R7).  
The legal position in South Africa before the new Act was introduced was that a CRA 
could be held delictually liable for damages. In order to be successful in such a case, 
factual and legal causality needs to be proved. Factual causality is easier to prove 
because it often involves negligence or gross negligence. Legal causality is 
‘extremely difficult to prove (almost impossible to prove in most cases)’ because it is 
very difficult to prove who ‘the legally attributable cause of this loss is’. The same 
principles apply to auditors, and this is the reason why lawsuits against auditors in 
South Africa are seldom successful’ (R4). The end result is that: 
‘Regulation is actually easing liability on CRA’s. Before [the new Act was introduced] they 
could be held delictually liable anyway. The new regulation exacerbates the problem – it’s 
much harder to prove them liable now...the problem of proving legal causality remains’ (R4). 
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It seems that even factual causality is also not always easy to prove – ‘it is difficult to 
prove a negligent rating, unless obvious mistakes have been made’ (R2). An 
Australian court recently ruled that S&P was guilty of misleading investors and has 
ordered them to pay damages (Kelly, 2012). This case is an ‘obvious example where 
a CRA was negligent and made errors in its calculations’. It is important to point out 
that most legal actions against CRA’s post-2008 have not been successful, despite 
the mistakes that were made (R3). 
‘It’s a very, very hard thing to prove…If they’ve made an error in a calculation on one of their 
models, arguably they’re negligent, but a rating is no protection against fraud, that is clearly 
understood...my fear is that there is huge amount of ignorance about details of what rating 
agencies do. Rating agencies are complex institutions and they issue complex opinions. Now 
it’s newsworthy when someone’s downgraded. But, how many people that have an opinion on 
it, bothered to read the reasons for that downgrade? Take, for example, the recent sovereign 
downgrade in South Africa. How many people have bothered to read that piece? Yet 
everyone’s got an opinion on it. It makes very interesting reading. (R2)’ 
Despite the attention and notoriety that CRA’s have attracted following their errors 
leading up to the 2008 crisis, they are still largely misunderstood by many market 
participants. Governments and regulators alike have tried to restrict CRA’s by 
instituting stringent liability laws to protect the public in the future, should these 
agencies err (R1; R2; R6). Through the lens of modernity theory, this is part of the 
process of reacting to prior failures and reassuring stakeholders that the expert 
system remains sound.  
Initially, the comment that new South African regulations are: ‘trying to suppress 
overreliance on ratings and shift more responsibility onto investors’ (R2) seems in 
conflict with the functioning of modernity mechanisms. A key point to remember, 
however, is that CRA’s are firmly entrenched in world financial markets and at 
present there are no readily available alternatives (Flannery et al., 2010). As one 
interviewee explained:  
‘Institutions and politicians react defensively to downgrades – ‘it’s like insulting a family 
member...something you can’t do...even if it’s completely plausible to downgrade, it’s very rare 
that they accept a downgrade and understand it properly’ (R6).  
Nevertheless, CRA’s continue to operate, even after the introduction of new 
regulation and increased liability clauses. In South Africa, the Act, therefore, 
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attempts to regulate the rating agencies while simultaneously requiring market 
players to understand CRA’s better, rather than attacking and blaming them for past 
failures (R1; R2; R5; R6). 
It appears that regulators must perform a delicate balancing act when it comes to 
CRA liability. CRA’s perform a function which financial markets value (despite their 
recent failings) and their credit opinions are very valuable. In fact, whether or not 
CRA’s are willing to acknowledge it, the role they play in financial markets is a public 
interest role (R2; R8; R9; R11; R12). Legal liability must, therefore, be reasonable. 
On the one hand, it must be substantial enough to deter negligent or fraudulent 
behaviour if the relevant regulations are to have the intended effect of bolstering 
confidence in the expert system. On the other hand, it should not be so excessive 
that it makes the industry undesirable for new and incumbent players, leading to 
functional problems which can be just as damaging as a crisis of trust. In other 
words, care must be taken to balance the need to reassure non-experts about the 
ability of the CRA’s to function. Lastly, there must be some form of accountability for 
the CRA’s, especially in light of their considerable power16.  
Some concern was raised about the liability clauses in the Credit Rating Services Act 
(2012). It seems that even if a CRA rates an instrument diligently, and the rating 
seems appropriate, investors may still be able to bring a legal action against the 
CRA if they make a loss at a later time. If a rating proves to be incorrect due to 
market conditions changing, or unforeseen events, CRA’s should not be subject to 
liability. It may be appropriate to provide further guidance on the liability clauses in 
the new Act (R1; R2; R4; R8). 
‘If I’ve read one aspect of it [the Act] correctly, I’m quite alarmed, which is the implication that 
if a credit rating agency carries out a credit rating, even if it does it diligently, and that rating 
would seem to be appropriate, that if an investor loses money later, that they will have an 
action that they can bring against the rating agency. Now if that’s true, then this is even worse 
than being an auditor! I know it’s hard to conceive of anything worse than an auditor but there 
you can be presumed to be liable for damages even if you’ve done a good job, as opposed to 
                                                           
16
 CRA power is highlighted by many authors. Partnoy (1999) and White (2010a) underline the rating 
agencies’ exemption from liability and the regulatory reliance placed on ratings (discussed in more 
detail in Section 2.3). Mulligan (2009) draws attention to the fact that Moody’s, S&P and Fitch hold 
98% of the world market share for ratings. Lastly, Friedman (1995) and Sinclair (2005) also 
emphasize CRA power over debt capital markets and they show the serious consequences of 
upgrades or downgrades by a CRA. 
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compensating people where you’ve been negligent in the performance of your duties, which I 
think would be an acceptable penalty’ (R1).   
The above respondent warned that if this reading of the Act was correct, this would 
be a ‘huge disincentive’ to go into the CRA industry in South Africa and it would also 
discourage existing CRA’s from operating in South Africa. If CRA’s add value 
(Cavallo, Powell, & Rigobón, 2008) and stop operating in South Africa due to a 
burdensome legal environment, it would ‘generally reflect badly on our local 
economy and our ability to raise capital at an affordable level’ (R1).  
As a result, there also may be a need to limit claims against CRA’s. Harper (2011, p. 
1969) states that unlimited liability for CRA’s is not a viable option at this stage, as 
there are no alternatives to CRA’s. The same is true in South Africa where it was 
pointed out that a CRA profession would have to develop in order to institute a limit 
on liability. To put this in context, a cap on auditor liability was only introduced after 
an auditing profession was well-established. Essentially, auditors were required to 
register with a professional body that regulates their activities and stipulates certain 
procedures, allowing for a relaxation of the extent to which auditors are held liable 
(R7; R9). It is very unlikely, however, that a CRA profession will be developed in 
South Africa in the near future because of the costs involved and the small market 
for credit ratings (R1; R2; R8; R9).  
‘Absolutely...I don’t think that rating agencies should be protected in some special manner 
from lawsuits, but I don’t think it’s a solution to the problem to hold them liable. I mean it’s an 
interesting one. There was a time when auditors were being blamed for everything and, in 
fact, ultimately there was a need for legislation to protect auditors to limit the size of damages 
claims because the auditor profession couldn’t operate. Otherwise, it was a choice of whether 
you want auditors or not, which is a whole different debate...there is a danger that the rating 
agencies are going to be blamed for poor investment decisions, but, yes, I do believe they 
should be held accountable’ (R2).       
Several interviews noted that there is a risk that CRA’s may be above the law, in 
certain instances, due to the their immense power in debt capital markets (R1; R2; 
R4; R6; R8; R9; R12). Consequently, most respondents agreed that some measure 
of legal liability was necessary:  
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‘You cannot place the amount of responsibility that was placed on CRA’s [prior to the 2008 
crisis] without requiring them to be liable if they don’t adhere to the standards - both 
government and the ones they’ve put there for themselves’ (R4). 
‘I think it’s proper for regulation to say: We are giving this responsibility to the CRA’s, if they 
don’t fulfil their duties in terms of this regulation, they can be held liable by third parties who 
have suffered a loss’ (R4). 
As noted above, however, a balance is needed between holding the CRA’s bona fide 
liable for damages and protecting the industry against frivolous claims:  
‘On the one hand, it doesn’t help if you have regulation but can’t take action against them. On 
the other hand, if the liability is so heavy, nobody will want to enter that market. The concept 
of liability must be there, but the regulation must be very clear on liability...the test cannot be 
that we never make mistakes and that you get killed for making mistakes. The reasonable 
person test should be used – would a reasonable person have come to a similar decision?’ 
(R8)  
‘If liability is too burdensome, it makes it difficult to attract people to that profession...it must 
be reasonable and it needs to be balanced. Liability can’t be too much, but it can’t be too little 
either, otherwise auditors and CRA’s might think they can get away with anything. Auditors 
and CRA’s are powerful and can sweep things under the carpet – we must not allow that’ 
(R9). 
In summary, the new Act will possibly make it more difficult for investors to hold 
CRA’s liable for misrepresentation. The new regulation places more responsibility on 
investors to make informed investment decisions and this, in turn, will make it more 
difficult to hold CRA’s liable. The new regulation does not amend the current position 
– one can hold a CRA delictually liable but the problem of proving legal causality 
remains (R4). On the one hand, this reflects the desire to regulate the industry 
(Section 4.1.1) without imposing undue legal liability risk on the CRA’s. On the other 
hand, the limitation of legal liability could be an example of an unforeseen 
consequence of regulation. As highlighted by Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004) and 
Black (2010), modernity is characterised by a high degree of institutional complexity 
leading to the possibility of new regulatory measures – introduced to restore 
confidence in the expert system – operating contrary to the expectations of policy-
makers.  
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4.2 The limitations and unforeseen consequences of regulation 
4.2.1 A paradox: Increasing the dependency on rating agencies  
 
CRA regulation worldwide has sought to reduce regulatory reliance on ratings, as 
well as encourage increased competition in the CRA industry (R1; R2; R4; R6; R8). 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch hold 98% of the world market share for ratings (R2; R4; R6). 
 
‘Regulators must be careful with new regulation, not to extend the problem unwittingly by 
making it more difficult for new entrants...every new piece of regulation is another barrier to 
entry’ (R4). 
The fact that CRA’s are being regulated means that they have to contend with 
increased compliance costs, as well as increased exposure to liability (Section 4.1.3) 
This makes it very difficult for new entrants into the CRA industry (R1; R2; R4; R6; 
R8). White (2011) and Harper (2011) agree with this sentiment. White (2011) states 
that some of the sections in the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) may increase barriers to 
entry and may make the incumbent CRA’s more vital to bond markets. In the U.S.A, 
Harper (2011) doubts whether or not new entrants will be able to build good 
reputations to become NRSRO’s, seeing that such a status will expose them to 
increased liability, coupled with reduced reliance on NRSRO ratings.    
Despite the reputational damage that CRA’s suffered as a result of the financial 
crisis, ironically, CRA’s are presently in a stronger position than they were before the 
crisis. This is a direct result of the regulatory response to the crisis. Despite the 
efforts to reduce reliance on CRA’s, as discussed above, greater reliance is being 
placed on the agencies than was before the crisis (R2; R4; R6; R8). 
‘Ironically their role has been strengthened. Everything that has happened, the whole 
response to 2008, has been to place greater reliance on the rating agencies. So, has their 
reputation been destroyed - maybe. Has it been a terrible thing for rating agencies? I don’t 
think so. They endured a tough year or so, but their financial performance is not entirely bad 
at the moment. You just have to track their share prices...You’ve seen them! (R2)’ 
When it comes to South Africa, several smaller CRA’s operate along with the big 
three. Some interviewees took the position that regulation should not address 
competition (or lack thereof) (R4; R6; R7). Others, however, claim that growing the 
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CRA industry is very important and that the new Act will be a failure if there are not 
more CRA’s operating in South Africa in the near future  (R8; R9; R11; R12).    
‘...if regulation is done to restrict new entrants into the market, then I think that would be 
counter-productive to a market-based economy. If the regulation is there to protect and 
enforce what serves the market best, then that’s something that I think I could live with and 
support’ (R1).   
‘It’s very scary actually...we’re trying to open up the market by regulating them more! It’s a 
very interesting point, but it’s the only way we’re going to get there’ (R8). 
‘The position of the Big Three17 right now is stronger than it has ever been. There is regulation 
risk now. Regulators want more CRA’s but they’re trying to control them more also, so it’s a 
difficult situation’ (R6). 
Ironically, the regulation introduced to preserve confidence in the expert system has 
the effect of strengthening the position of key industry players, making it difficult for 
alternatives to the current rating structures to take hold (R2; R6). Modernity 
mechanisms mean that assumed confidence placed in external regulation of expert 
systems (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004) aids in legitimising the existing industry 
practices and players to the extent that alternatives become unimaginable 
(Suchman, 1995). As discussed in Section 4.1, regulation has become an 
inextricable part of the modern capital system, and a financial world without 
regulation of the CRA’s is inconceivable. Despite the fact that regulation entrenches 
the very CRA’s that played an infamous role in the 2008 crisis, regulators want to be 
seen as acting strongly in response to a crisis. They, therefore, regulate the industry 
and, in doing so, entrench the existing rating agencies rather than decrease the 
regulatory burden on CRA’s in order to open up the industry for new entrants (see 
Section 4.1).  
As discussed in Section 2.3.4, White (2010b) also warns that the introduction of 
more regulation will further entrench CRA’s, as opposed to making entrance into the 
CRA industry easier. With regulation and the self-interest of governments closely 
linked (Section 4.1.1), it is likely that regulators fear being perceived as failing to 
respond to a crisis of confidence with added regulation more than the unforeseen 
consequences of those new laws.  
                                                           
17
 Moody’s, S&P and Fitch – as referred to in Section 2.3.1 above. 
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The next subsection highlights both the limitations and the unforeseen 
consequences of CRA regulation with respect to investor responsibility. One of the 
main limitations seems to be that investors still rely heavily on CRA’s, despite CRAs’ 
failings. Furthermore, the fact that CRA regulation has been introduced has 
seemingly lessened the burden of responsibility on CRA’s, whilst increasing the 
burden on investors for their investment decisions. This discussion follows below. 
4.2.2 Investor responsibility and the 2008 financial crisis 
 
New South African and other international CRA regulation places more responsibility 
on investors (R2; R4; R5; R10; R11). As explained by one interviewee:  
‘There seems to be a non-verbal devolution away from reliance on CRA’s towards independent 
and critical inquiry by investors’ (R4).  
CRA's have published their methodologies and further information about their ratings 
and the regulatory reliance on ratings seems to have eased somewhat. As explained 
by Mulligan (2009), the fact that CRA’s have come under intense scrutiny since 2008 
is a sign to investors that more caution and thought must be exercised when utilising 
credit ratings to make investment decisions. The same applies in South Africa (R2; 
R4; R10; R12).   
‘We are definitely seeing a concerted effort to take reliance away from ratings towards the 
investors taking more responsibility for their own decisions. CRA regulation is implying that 
investors must first assess the relationship between issuers and CRA’s and the reliability of 
the CRA itself...before you begin to look at the rating itself’ (R10). 
‘Investors must now form their own opinions on the ratings, CRA’s and rated products’ (R12). 
All respondents concurred that investors relied too heavily on CRA’s leading up the 
financial crisis (see also Mulligan, 2009; Partnoy, 2009b). Blame for the 2008 
financial crisis was, however, also attributed to investors. Some interviewees went so 
far as to claim that the investors who invested in AAA, or similarly rated, subprime 
mortgages were primarily to blame for the financial meltdown (R1; R3; R4; R10). 
Investors did not understand what they were investing in, and it is difficult to 
reconcile how investors could have invested in highly complex financial instruments 
without the requisite understanding (R2; R4; R5; R8; R10). As explained by one 
respondent, ‘investing in something that you do not understand is a recipe for 
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disaster' (R5). Hill (2011a) asserts that investors have admitted that they did not 
understand the securities that they purchased. Most interviewees concurred with this 
view and concluded that placing the blame on rating agencies was an attempt by 
investors to abrogate their responsibility to carry out a due diligence on their material 
investments.  
The ‘outsourcing of risk assessments to CRA’s’ (by all market participants, including 
regulators and investors) was ‘one of the single biggest causes of the crisis’ (R4). 
Financial markets placed a considerable amount of confidence in credit ratings 
before 2008 because of mandatory or quasi-mandatory use of these ratings being 
required by regulation or in terms of investment fund rules. The over-reliance on 
credit ratings (as described in detail by Partnoy, 2009b) highlights two key issues: 
first, due to the mandatory or quasi-mandatory use of credit ratings, investors 
became complacent and did not conduct adequate research before making 
investment decisions. Second, there was a general lack of questioning which led to a 
‘herd mentality’ among investors, especially when it came to mortgage-backed 
securities and other complex financial instruments (R1; R2; R3; R5; R6; R8). The 
fact that a large number of instruments were receiving AAA ratings did not arouse 
suspicion from the majority of market participants. As explained by one interviewee:  
‘nobody listens to a naysayer in a bull market’ (R2) (see also Hill, 2010a). 
Consequently, there was an appeal by respondents for investors to be more 
responsible with regard to their reliance on credit ratings:  
‘Yes, you can blame the rating agencies, however investors make their choice. Ultimately the 
investors made bad investment decisions. Yes, there were some of those investments that 
were of dubious morality, I accept that. I accept that they over-sold...but ultimately investors 
bought things and they didn’t understand what they had bought’ (R2). 
‘CRA’s don’t add value. The problem is that the market wants ratings from CRA’s, therefore, 
issuers have to get them. The market places a value on credit ratings from CRA’s. You have 
to do your own research to judge creditworthiness. Investors must do their own research – the 
same as banks. This is a very important point...however, it will also cost money to do your 
own research’ (R3). 
This may be especially true when it comes to the valuation of complex financial 
instruments. CRA’s were heavily criticised for rating instruments which they did not 
fully understand (R2; R5; R6; R10; R11). Lewis (2010) describes the situation pre-
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2008, where the benefit of hindsight reveals that CRA’s did not understand the risk 
attached to subprime securities - while professionally and morally problematic, 
investors should still take full responsibility for the losses on complex instruments, 
which they did not properly understand (R2; R5; R11; R12).  
‘Now what I think happened was that in the late nineties securitisation started growing. Rating 
agencies started beefing up their capacity to deal with it. They employed some very, very 
smart mathematicians, who worked together with traditional credit analysts and lawyers...You 
need all those skills to understand the risk of securitisation and they started developing some 
very clever methodologies to assess the risk of securitisation...The problem, initially, was that 
they [CRA’s] developed a separate model for each transaction. Now each transaction is 
unique. The problem is, as volume transactions started growing in the early 2000’s, they 
didn’t have enough people to create these models and they thought they could employ any 
old idiot with a PhD in physics who was going to be able to rate this accurately. The reality is 
they started just using the same model over and over again, even though the circumstances 
were different’ (R2). 
Factors which resulted in CRA errors included a lack of capacity to deal with the 
volume of securitised transactions coupled with an incomplete understanding of 
those transactions. Another significant factor was that there was a ‘loss of 
scepticism’ (R1).The approach used to rate complex financial instruments was too 
mechanical and quantitative in nature. As important as quantitative statistical 
analysis is, rating analysts should have taken a broader view of market conditions 
(R1; R2; R7): 
‘Perhaps they weren’t asking enough questions...in looking at a bond issue, then they have to 
look at all of the economics underlying that – the business purpose for it, and to understand 
all of the risks, and what the response is to those risks. AAA is the best rating you give to 
anything. How many people get ten out of ten? So something should have sounded a warning 
signal to them when the number of AAA-rated debt instruments was increasing rapidly and all 
for the same type of instrument. Something’s going on’ (R1). 
While this criticism was widely shared, several interviewees were sceptical about 
whether or not regulation would be able to address shortcomings in acumen of 
analysts and executives at CRA’s. The same is true of well-entrenched 
methodologies for rating instruments. It is not clear if new regulation is internalised 
as predicted by policy-makers. Without necessarily changing the manner in which 
analysts operate or their attitude towards the rating process, it seems unlikely that 
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regulation will be able to change dramatically the processes used by CRA’s to 
perform their rating services18 (R1; R7; R8; R10).  
Credit ratings should not be the only tool used by investment houses, banks or 
insurers. Rather, ‘ratings should form part of a suite of tools’ to help an investor 
make a decision (R6). There is a need for diversity of opinion when making 
investment decisions. ‘Good risk-management comes with diversity of opinion’ (R2; 
R7). Hill (2010b) proposes that investors should be encouraged to rely less on 
CRA’s. Furthermore, Darbellay and Partnoy (2012, p. 23) state that ‘behavioural 
reliance on ratings has been deeply anchored in the financial markets’ and it will take 
time to find alternatives that can be used instead of, or in conjunction with, CRA 
ratings.   
Several respondents were, however, concerned that, almost 7 years after the start of 
the 2007/2008 financial crisis, investors remain heavily reliant on CRA’s for key 
investment decisions (R1; R3; R5; R9). These interviewees felt that the regulation 
has not resulted in more investor awareness. Paradoxically, the power of external 
regulation to secure confidence of outsiders in the functioning of expert systems has 
perpetuated a misconception that CRA’s operate efficiently and effectively and that 
their ratings can be automatically relied upon. The result is that some investors have 
‘barely reacted’ to the 2007/2008 financial crisis and ‘astonishingly’ still place their 
trust in CRA’s (Hill, 2010b, p. 16). Cane et al. (2011, p. 37) argue that new 
securitised instruments have become too complex for average institutional investors 
and ‘this increasingly means that investors are essentially forced to rely on CRA’s as 
the information concerning these investments is simply too difficult to understand’. 
Arguably, however, the complexity of an investment does not negate the need for a 
prudential financial analysis.  
This is not to say that CRA’s should not be accountable for their ratings (see also 
Section 4.1.3). Interviewees unanimously agreed that those in positions of trust 
ought to be subject to monitoring and regulation. For several respondents, this 
meant that, despite the investor’s responsibility to perform his own due diligence, 
regulations should entrench the principle of accountability for CRA’s.   
 
                                                           
18
 The researcher would like to thank one of the external examiners for pointing this out.  
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‘CRA’s will claim that investors must do their own homework. I don’t buy that. If they 
[investors] must do homework themselves, why do we need CRA’s at all? The fact is that 
people rely on them and they must give some level of assurance! People must be able to rely 
on what they say...there must be a certain level of comfort. If they can’t do that, then why do 
we need them at all? They claim that it’s just an opinion [that they offer], but it’s the only 
opinion in the market! (R8)’ 
‘There is a big consumer education problem, I think. It’s quite hard to blame the investors [for 
the 2008 crisis] because really, it should be the responsibility of the whole financial 
community [including CRA’s] to educate investors about what the risks of these products are 
and were, and they weren’t really [educated properly]’ (R6).      
‘CRA’s are independent private sector bodies. Irrespective of what happened, the reality is 
that they’re just giving their opinion on something. Yes, they could have been wrong and 
should have been stricter on ratings, but they didn’t seem to understand what was going on. 
Not only them, everyone didn’t seem to know what was going on...You do rely on the CRA’s 
in some sense, but the ultimate responsibility lies with the person who invests. If you don’t 
understand instruments you are buying, ultimately it’s your responsibility’ (R5). 
Those who claim that CRA’s must act in the best interests of the public are reluctant 
to blame investors, especially in relation to the consumer education problems when it 
comes to complex financial instruments (R2, R5, R10). The findings seem to suggest 
that if CRA ratings cannot be relied on (with a reasonable amount of assurance), 
then CRA’s seemingly do not add value to financial markets and are perhaps 
obsolete (R3; R8; R9). On the other hand, CRA’s operate as private entities with an 
objective of making profits. CRA’s offer creditworthiness opinions which must be 
taken into account, along with other credit opinions (R2; R5; R10).   
The topic of how investors make their investment decisions is a complex one. It is 
unclear from the findings who should bear the ultimate responsibility of educating 
investors. The views of who should be responsible for educating investors range 
from financial gatekeepers, to regulators, to investors themselves (R1; R2; R6; R7; 
R8; R10): 
‘I think the difficulty at the end of the day is that we seem to have lost the ability, apart from a 
few fund managers and a few individuals who’ve got time on their hands, to make judgements 
about what we think we should invest in. Some people just take bets...people are not making 
informed judgements. It’s a whole separate research paper as to why they’re doing that, but it 
seems to be a general malaise. It’s apparent, not only in South Africa, but it’s around the 
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world  that people now don’t want to do the work that enables them to make the judgement 
and it’s easier to take the view of somebody else and go with the rest of the herd’ (R1). 
In summary, there are conflicting views with regard to investor responsibility. In its 
simplest form, the issue is: how much reliance should investors place on credit 
ratings? Those who argue that CRA’s perform a public interest role in financial 
markets are of the opinion that investors must be able to place great reliance on 
CRA’s. On the other hand, perhaps investors need to be more cautious with credit 
ratings due to CRA failures leading up to 2008. The introduction of CRA regulation 
seems to infer that there has been a loss of ‘trust’ in CRA’s (R7; R8). This, in turn, 
means that investors will bear the brunt of criticism for bad investment decisions in 
the future, even if they still choose to rely solely on credit ratings.  
One of the biggest areas of contention with respect to CRA’s is the issuer-pays 
business model and the potential conflicts of interest that it introduces. A discussion 
about CRA regulation would be incomplete without addressing the issuer-pays 
business model. The next subsection looks into this area and highlights certain 
limitations of regulators when it comes to regulating privately owned entities such as 
CRA’s (despite the public-interest role that they purportedly play). 
4.2.3 The issuer-pays business model 
 
CRA regulation in South Africa, and in other jurisdictions, does not directly address 
the CRA issuer-pays business model. The fact that new regulation worldwide does 
not address this controversial issue highlights the limitation of some regulation (R4; 
R5; R6). CRA’s are privately owned businesses which focus on revenues and profit. 
As discussed, the mandatory or quasi-mandatory use of ratings entrenched the need 
for CRA’s and they became very powerful as a result (R2; R4; R5). Despite the 
public interest role which CRA’s play in financial markets, regulators worldwide have 
deemed it a step too far to legislate how they should earn their keep. This may be 
due to that fact that there are no obvious viable alternate business models. The more 
likely reason is that CRA’s are powerful and they would not agree to be dictated to 
by regulators with respect to what business model they should use. Several 
respondents referred to CRA power throughout their interviews (R2; R4; R5; R6; R7; 
R8; R10).. Although it was never explicitly stated, interviewees intimated that CRA’s 
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have the power to hold governments to ransom, especially with respect to how they 
earn their keep (Section 2.3). In particular, the power of the CRA’s has allowed the 
issuer-pays model to become firmly entrenched. 
‘CRA’s went largely unregulated until relatively recently – it was thought that their reputation 
was of such importance that they could not afford not to put checks on themselves. It seems 
that the reputational hazard was not enough’ (R4). 
The above respondent confirms Partnoy (1999) and White’s (2010a) belief that the 
reputational hazard of publishing inaccurate ratings was not enough to curb greedy 
or negligent CRA behaviour. The main concern with an issuer-pays model is that 
CRA’s will rate favourably (and often inaccurately) in order to preserve their client 
base. One respondent asked: ‘Why get a rating if it’s going to be bad news, 
especially if you’ve got to pay for it? (R1)’ For example, leading up to the financial 
crisis in 2008, issuers who were paying for the ratings of complex financial 
instruments were able to secure favourable ratings from CRA’s.  
There was general agreement among interviewees that the business model 
introduces several conflicts of interest (R1; R2; R3; R4; R6; R8). 
‘...the issuer pays for the rating. This is an important point. You can put checks and balances 
in place but does it help? Especially before the financial crisis, did CRA’s really stick their 
necks out? No, because the issuer was paying them for the rating’ (R8).  
The topic of business model, and how CRA’s earn their revenues, led to a discussion 
on whether or not CRA’s see themselves as a profession serving the public interest 
or as businesses operating with the primary intention of earning a profit19. With 
respect to CRA’s, there was almost unanimous agreement that they are first and 
foremost a business, focused on ‘money-making’ (R3) and the ‘bottom line’ (R2) (see 
also Partnoy, 2006).  
‘They [CRA’s] are a business. Regulators want to try to make sure they are a 
profession...CRA’s, lawyers and auditors, they’re all businesses. You will never totally get 
them to have that mind-set [of acting like a profession which serves the public interest]. Those 
days are gone realistically. I think everyone is in it to make money...The whole thing of a 
profession is inherently flawed’ (R8).  
                                                           
19
 Similarly, there has been ongoing debate among auditors as to whether auditing is a profession or 
a business (although this is beyond the scope of this research). 
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As in the U.S.A (Partnoy, 2006), respondents confirmed that CRA’s make the vast 
majority of their revenue from issuers who pay them for ratings. CRA’s also sell 
additional research to investors who request further information but the revenues 
from the sale of this additional research are minimal in comparison (R2; R6).  
Notwithstanding the criticism of the issuer-pays model, respondents were unable to 
suggest practical alternatives. An investor-pays model was mentioned but CRA’s 
would not agree to such a change at present (R1; R2; R4; R5; R6; R7). Furthermore, 
an investor-pays model could potentially introduce other problems and conflicts of 
interest: 
‘With the investor-pays model, it would take the opposite approach, but there would still be 
the same problems. Whilst ratings could be inflated under an issuer-pays model, they would 
be deflated under the investor-pays. Ratings are used for credit default swaps, effectively the 
yield on debt. Investors want the highest possible yield and issuers want the lowest possible 
yield, so you’ve got problems on either side’ (R6). 
If investors were to pay for ratings, this may tempt issuers to use less qualified or 
less reputable CRA’s to produce their preferred rating (R2). On this point, Coffee 
(2010) also questions ‘whether the rating agency so chosen will have credibility’.  
‘Is that ethical [The investor-pays business model]? I don’t know. Don’t ask me, I’m sure 
there’s some wiser person than me who could answer that question. I don’t know, to be 
perfectly honest. But I’m not sure if I have a better suggestion, than issuer-pays. It’s a bit like 
auditors, it’s probably a less than perfect solution. If the investor pays the company being 
rated, how are they going to choose the rating agency? Are they going to choose [a CRA] that 
is a reputable one and not go for the one who is least qualified to give them the right 
rating?...Will they automatically have an appropriate relationship if they are not paying them to 
do it? I don’t know if it does it’ (R2).  
The possible introduction of a government rating agency was discussed but this 
possibility was summarily dismissed. All respondents supported the preservation of 
the status quo, relying on privately-owned CRA’s. In terms of modernity theory, 
CRA’s have become so entrenched that a significant reform to the system is 
unimaginable. Coffee (2010) also suggests a state-run CRA may be an alternative to 
the issuer-pays model, but not without its limitations. Despite the errors that CRA’s 
made in the past, it seems that all the respondents would still rely on the incumbent 
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privately-owned CRA’s over a government rating agency CRA (R1; R2; R4; R5; R6; 
R7).    
‘You could get government to pay for ratings by issuing a government body. Would you trust a 
government body rating bonds? Frankly, I wouldn’t. Governments don’t always attract the 
right people, don’t have the right methodology and governments are controlled by politicians 
who have objectives different from a free and fully informed market’ (R1). 
Respondents agreed that existing regulation, including South Africa’s Act, does very 
little to address conflicts of interest arising from the issuer-pays model. The result is 
the rating process, including the relationship between the rated and the CRA’s, 
remains a black box which regulators dare not open. CRA’s are so powerful and 
firmly entrenched in the capital market that governments are either unable to 
regulate them, or unwilling to confront them on issues where they will be met with 
fierce resistance (R1; R4; R6; R8).   
According to some respondents, CRA’s have little choice other than to make issuers 
pay for ratings. The free access to information on the Internet would severely 
damage rating agencies’ profitability if an investor-pays model were to be used (R1; 
R4; R6). In addition, markets try to supply investors with as much information as 
possible in order to generate investment, so it seems that an issuer-pays model 
ensures that important information is available to all market participants, most 
importantly investors (R1; R4; R6).  
‘My experience with most investors is that they get information free. Generally they [investors] 
are in a position of power - people want to give them information. Therefore there was bound 
to be a rating agency or somebody who would come up with ratings that the investor wouldn’t 
have to pay for. So if you’re not going to have the investor paying for it, then the rating 
agencies have got little choice [other than to make issuers pay]’ (R1). 
If CRA’s are going to continue to employ an issuer-pays model, ‘they must be able to 
demonstrate that they can add value to the instruments being rated’ (R1). This 
potential problem could be seen as the beginning of an ‘unfortunate moral hazard’ 
(R7). CRA’s might find themselves in the same position as auditors. There is an 
implication that, because the issuer is paying for the rating, it will be able to generate 
a good rating from the CRA. This implies that a CRA may deviate from the guidelines 
and rules as set down in its established rating methodology in order to issue a more 
favourable rating. The alternative is to issue a fair rating but risk losing a potentially 
70 | P a g e  
 
lucrative deal. This problem can be compared to an auditor who threatens to qualify 
a report, and is subsequently threatened with the loss of that client as a result (R1; 
R7; R8). 
‘Part of the issue is whether or not they’re dealing in a commodity, which is the rating, or if 
they’re dealing in a service, which is how a company can improve its appearance, to get a 
better rating. Nobody’s quite sure, because there are no standards that are understood, 
communicated to people as to how the rating agencies come up with their ratings’ (R1). 
If an issuer-pays model is to be successful, there must be “Chinese Walls” in place 
(R5; R6). In theory, such mechanisms are meant to separate credit analysts from the 
commercial negotiations surrounding a rating. Most respondents rejected the idea of 
Chinese Walls stating: ‘they don’t work’ (R4), ‘they are see-through’ (R10), ‘Chinese 
Walls are useless and they are not fine at all (R9)’. Regardless of the fact that CRA’s 
endeavour to separate their credit analysts from commercial dealings with their 
clients, it appears that the analysts are almost always aware when they are issuing 
ratings for important clients (R2; R4; R6; R8; R9; R10) - ‘the issuer-pays model still 
places a bias on the credit analysts’ (R4). 
Like White (2010a), one interviewee offered a possible defence that might be used 
by CRA’s. This interviewee stated that CRA’s may claim that they issue so many 
ratings (tens of thousands per year), that the revenue from one single rating is 
insignificant and it would not be worth risking their reputations by subverting a single 
rating or a group of ratings. This interviewee stated that ‘this argument makes sense 
on the surface, but it’s not entirely true’ (R2).  
There may, however, be a more complex problem than the issuer-pays model – the 
relationship between investment banks and CRA’s (White, 2010a). This relationship 
seemingly requires intense scrutiny and investigation (R2).  
‘Right, that the revenue from any single rating is so insignificant that it is not worth putting 
their reputation at stake, that on the surface that makes a lot of sense. But that’s not entirely 
true...that glosses over a vital fact, and this is why I am not sure if the question is about who 
pays. It’s a more complex issue - a key relationship is with the merchant bank, the investment 
bank advising the debt issuer, because they usually influence which rating agency is used. 
So, as a result, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch never want to get on the wrong side of Goldman 
Sacks, Morgan Stanley...Absolutely, there are a dozen major banking institutions that are 
advising on the vast majority of material debt issues in the world. Now there’s a cosy 
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relationship between those guys and the rating agencies. That is the problem, not the bank 
that the issuer pays...ultimately the issuer chooses the rating agency, but they are severely 
influenced, they are fundamentally influenced by their adviser [investment bank] on the debt 
issue’ (R2).   
Although all the interviewees would support the pursuit of an alternate business 
model, they all accepted that the issuer-pays model will continue for the foreseeable 
future. A key reason for this is the current high levels of profitability achieved by the 
CRA’s. It seems unlikely that CRA’s would agree to a change in business model – 
one respondent in particular was adamant that this is due to rating agency power: 
‘you cannot tell them what to do’ (R5). It should also be noted that, despite all the 
flaws that were identified regarding the issuer paying for ratings, no feasible 
alternatives were offered as a solution.  
‘If a bright spark can come up with a way that CRA’s are happy with the way they are paid, 
and regulators and markets are as well...Until such a time, I don’t see the issuer-pays model 
going anywhere, because fundamentally, that’s where the money is’ (R6).  
As discussed in Section 4.1, governments place importance on maintaining a 
perception of an attractive economy. There may also be no real incentive to reform 
the CRA business model in this case. CRA’s are very powerful institutions and it may 
suffice for government to create the impression of good regulation and a sound 
economy. Malsch and Gendron (2011) analyse the drastic change in the regulatory 
landscape for auditors over the past two decades. It was once considered 
unthinkable to regulate the way auditors conducted their business (Malsch & 
Gendron, 2011). It should be noted that auditors are also powerful institutions (Levitt, 
2002). At present, almost all aspects of the auditing profession are thoroughly 
regulated, and that begs the question: Why should gatekeepers such as CRA’s be 
any different Malsch and Gendron (2011)?  
The fact that far-reaching CRA regulation worldwide has not directly tackled the 
issuer-pays business model, to a large degree highlights the limitations of this 
regulation. CRA’s are supposedly gatekeepers of financial markets and a 
responsibility is placed on them to keep markets fully informed and to hold market 
participants accountable. The great monetary incentives that CRA’s have are a real 
threat to their objectivity and independence. This has been made clear in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. The public’s trust in CRA’s was shaken, in large part 
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due to their skewed incentive structures. The fact that regulators either cannot, or 
feel that they cannot, dictate a viable substitute business model would support the 
school of thought that perceives regulation as a façade. This in turn begs the 
question: are the relevant regulators able to enforce the relevant regulations?  
4.2.4 Regulator ability and enforcement power 
 
The FSB is tasked with implementing and enforcing the Credit Rating Services Act 
(2012) in South Africa. There were differing views with regard to the FSB. Some 
claimed that the FSB is more than capable of enforcing CRA regulation in South 
Africa (R8; R9; R11), whilst others questioned whether the FSB had the skills and 
resources to  understand CRA’s and regulate them adequately (R2; R10).      
‘I think the FSB has a very good track record...I think they have the mindset of a good 
regulator – that’s not too draconian and that wants to work with companies...it’s not as if they 
haven’t made mistakes. I think with some things they were too soft...but I think they’ve got 
good experience now, which counts for a lot...And I think that the other thing they do well is 
they look at best practice, they go elsewhere and see what are the lessons learned there and 
they try to come up with a South African solution...so they don’t necessarily try to completely 
reinvent the wheel, which is not always the right mindset...The FSB as a regulator has a good 
enough track record to deal with it [CRA’s]...as regulators go, they’re definitely in South Africa, 
the better one’ (R8).     
Some respondents, however, criticised the FSB, claiming that the South African CRA 
regulation is ‘boilerplate’ (R9) or simply a ‘copy and paste exercise’ (R8) from other 
jurisdictions (Section 4.1.1). Furthermore, the FSB was heavily criticised for the 
introduction of Regulation 28 (issued in terms of Section 36 of the Pension Funds 
Act (1956)). Regulation 28 mandates the use of ratings, and this goes against 
current international best practice. Currently, international best practice has moved 
toward reducing reliance on credit ratings by removing the mention or mandate for 
ratings (as discussed in Sections 2.3.4 and 4.2.1). Regulation 28 goes against this 
trend and ‘people in the industry on all sides find it a disaster’ (R2). As discussed 
above (Section 4.1), the replication of international best practice is key for securing 
the credibility of the capital market - it is unclear what the FSB’s intentions were with 
the introduction of Regulation 28, although it seems that the long term goal is to 
remove the mandatory use of credit ratings from regulations in South Africa (R4; R6; 
R13). On one hand, Regulation 28 is an example of an unforeseen consequence of 
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a regulation. On the other hand, respondents suggested that this showed a lack of 
clear direction on the part of the regulation and the regulator (R3).  
‘I fear in South Africa, that the FSB may not have the capability to do its job. So, I fear that the 
FSB does not have the ability to deal with the complexity of it...Their stated aim was to bring 
South Africa in line with international best practice but, in fact, a lot of what they were doing is 
in the opposite direction...International best practice at the moment is to try and lessen the 
official role of rating agencies...Regulation twenty-eight is moving in the exact opposite 
direction’ (R2). 
The ability of the FSB to enforce the relevant regulations is frustrated by a lack of 
resources and by the country’s legal system (R2; R7; R8).   
‘...the structure itself I think is a good structure. They’ve got some very competent people who 
were in there, they don’t have enough manpower to deal with all the issues that come up, so 
inevitably it takes a long time...it can take two or three years for the FSB to get it right, to 
actually come to a decision on what should happen...they often try to negotiate some sort of 
settlement which then compensates people that have suffered...it takes a long time to bring 
the thing to a conclusion, but that’s typical of the justice system in South Africa anyway. But 
what is concerning is that some of the judgements have been overturned subsequently or 
reduced and that indicates perhaps that there is a lack of impartiality in the way that they 
proceed against some people as compared to others. Is that a good thing or a bad thing? I 
don’t know.’ (R7) 
There is a growing public perception that regulators are incapable of carrying out 
their responsibilities efficiently and effectively, when, in fact, many matters are out of 
the regulators’ hands when the judiciary is involved. Despite the fact that this 
perception might be false, the legitimacy and reputation of regulators in South Africa 
suffers and trust in the capital system is eroded (R1; R7; R8; R10).  
Many respondents called for regulators to be granted power to enforce regulation 
without having to rely on the Courts. The advantages of this would be that issues 
would be dealt with far more quickly and public funds would no longer be wasted on 
drawn-out legal battles. The fact that so many cases in the past have been drawn 
out has further exacerbated the perception that regulators are inept and incapable 
(R7; R8). Trust in regulators and regulatory models has suffered as a result. If 
regulators were allowed to enforce regulation more effectively without relying on the 
judicial system, it might aid them in repairing their reputations and restoring some 
trust in the system (R7; R8; R9; R11: R12;).   
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‘If you got a regulator that simply has to say in the public interest the only thing I can do is to 
take you to court, I don’t know if that’s always in the public interest because it drags it out. 
Besides I’d hate to think how much money they’ve spent on legal fees, it’s very good for the 
legal profession, and so guess who writes the laws, but no! The regulators should be 
permitted to come to a decision and a judgement that is specific to the facts in the case that is 
not going to be used as you would typically see in other cases to set a precedent for others to 
follow or to argue constitutionality or otherwise. If you can reach an agreement with 
somebody, to me that’s a market-based solution even if it’s only between two people and, 
therefore, it’s done, let it lie and move on’ (R1). 
5. Conclusion 
 
5.1 Summarising comments 
 
This thesis confirms that regulation plays an important role in capital markets. The 
question is whether regulation is introduced, based on its merits or whether it merely 
acts a smokescreen to serve self-interests. The introduction of CRA regulation 
worldwide was a predictable and inevitable response to a financial crisis (Giddens, 
1991; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). The Credit Rating Services Act (2012) is South 
Africa’s attempt to conform to so-called international best practice. CRA regulation in 
South Africa should not, however, be taken at face value – it should be met with 
inquisitiveness. 
The issues of trust, power and credibility are clearly illustrated in this research. 
Governments flex their muscles by regulating the perceived culprits of the 2007/2008 
crisis (in this case CRA’s) through increased control and monitoring. On the one 
hand, governments try to restore trust and credibility in their respective economies to 
secure foreign investment and to achieve economic growth. Based on the 
experiences of foreign jurisdictions (a space distanciation) dealing with the 
2007/2008 financial crisis (a time distanciation), the South African government 
introduced new CRA regulation to restore confidence in capital systems. This is 
especially important, given the highly institutionalised environment characterising 
periods of late modernity, coupled with the country’s dependence on foreign capital 
as a developing economy. On the other hand, a paradox results - despite the 
involvement of the CRA’s in the financial crisis, their services and expertise are in 
75 | P a g e  
 
high demand and the CRA’s continue to have significant influence over financial 
markets. Once again, modernity theory sheds light on this apparent contradiction. 
With non-experts unable to understand fully the functioning of the rating systems, 
they rely on the good faith assumption that underlying technical properties are 
sound. Recently enacted regulations provide important reassurances, even if these 
are more symbolic than substantive.  
What this suggests is that regulation alone is not a solution to the problems posed by 
the dominance of the CRA’s. It is up to investors to decide if credit ratings are 
credible and investors should complement credit ratings with their own due diligence 
assessments. Good corporate governance also dictates that CRA’s must be 
accountable. The lack of practical alternatives or substitutes for ratings means that 
possible onerous liability referred to in the Credit Rating Services Act (2012) is not a 
workable solution at this stage. Regulators and other industry players have not found 
viable solutions to CRA accountability, and it is up to all market participants to decide 
if and how this issue should be addressed. It is also concerning that the new Act 
does not address the issuer-pays business model and its inherent conflicts of 
interest. It is likely that this is a subject that regulators will need to address in the 
future. Lastly, it is questionable whether CRA regulation will be able to address 
possible shortcomings in analytical acumen of rating analysts, improve their 
professional  judgment or lead to more holistic rating models which take quantitative 
and qualitative factors into account.  
Paradoxically, CRA regulation has further cemented the rating agencies’ position in 
financial markets. CRA’s are here to stay, and it is up to all market participants to 
create a way to improve them and the system at large. Modernity theory dictates that 
capital markets are social constructions swayed by past events and experiences. As 
reputations and world markets recover from the 2007/2008 crisis, the pendulum of 
regulation will probably swing back towards less oversight and looser controls.    
5.2 Contribution of this thesis 
 
This thesis makes an important contribution to the corporate governance literature. 
There are very few examples of interpretive and critical corporate governance 
research in South Africa and, in particular, research dealing with the importance of 
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understanding how regulations function in a practical setting. This study may also 
have practical applications for the CRA industry in South Africa.  
The findings will be of interest to regulators, politicians, CRA’s, investors and other 
industry players - CRA’s play a prominent role in international financial markets and 
it is, therefore, of importance that the regulation of these institutions is examined and 
understood. The introduction of CRA regulation has inevitably followed the 
2007/2008 crisis. The proliferation of CRA regulation necessitates that the nuances 
of regulation are discussed and understood. This includes the workings of regulation, 
how regulation legitimises the capital system, its limitations and the sometimes 
unforeseen consequences. The qualitative nature of this research and small sample 
size means that the findings should not be broadly generalised, however, this thesis 
lays the basis for future research and it should lead to more in-depth CRA research 
being conducted in South Africa. 
5.3 Limitations and areas for future research 
 
This thesis used Giddens’s (1990; 1991) modernity theory as a theoretical 
framework to examine the introduction of new CRA regulation in South Africa. 
Suchman’s (1995) legitimacy theory is incorporated into this research but it was not 
used as the primary theoretical framework. Future CRA regulation research could, 
therefore, concentrate specifically on the regulations which confer a sense of 
pragmatic, moral or cognitive legitimacy. Similarly, the issue of institutional power 
has only been touched on. How power dynamics between regulators, institutional 
investors and CRA’s lead to the development and application of relevant laws and 
regulations could be an interesting area for future research. In addition,  Malsch and 
Gendron (2011) examine the dynamics of power in the auditing regulatory space. It 
appears that a similar in-depth analysis of power in the rating agency regulatory 
arena is an important area for future research. 
The exploratory nature of this research, based on a small group of informed 
participants, means that the findings should not be generalised (as would be the 
case in a positivist study). As a result, future researchers should examine whether 
the concepts introduced in this thesis are applicable in other developing economies 
and whether or not perceptions of CRA regulations vary among stakeholders. (To 
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this end, it should be noted that there were no significant differences in the 
responses of the different types (or groups) of respondents in this study, although 
this was not the focal point of the research). 
Finally, at the time of completion of this study, the Credit Rating Services Act (2012) 
is still in its early stages of implementation. It will be interesting to observe how 
South African regulators implement and internalise this new regulation. Follow-up 
studies ought to be conducted to assess the respective strengths, weaknesses, 
successes and failures of this new Act. In particular, it would be interesting to explore 
the actual processes followed by the CRA’s to grade instruments and how, if at all, 
this has changed following the financial crisis and promulgation of recent regulation. 
To this end, future research should focus on whether the new Act adds tangible 
value or whether its introduction has been a “smoke and mirrors” exercise as 
suggested by most of the respondents participating in this research.  
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VI Appendix 1 – Interview agenda 
 
1. What is the rationale for regulation?  
2. What role does regulation play? (With specific reference to South Africa) 
3. Was the financial crisis the result of a lack of regulation or a lack of 
enforcement? In addition, what role did CRA’s play, if any? 
4. What are the key features of good regulation, and why? (Including a 
discussion of independent government versus self-regulation) 
5. With reference to regulation, please share your views on matters of trust, 
credibility and legitimacy.  
6. If trust existed between stakeholders, would we need regulation? 
7. What should regulation address and what should be left to market forces? 
8. What is the role of regulators in the market?  
9. Does regulation play a role with respect to a country’s reputation and foreign 
investment? 
10. Why did South African regulators introduce the Credit Rating Services Act 
(2012)? 
11. Does South Africa need the same kind of CRA regulation as the United 
States? 
12. What are your views on the new South African CRA regulation? 
13. What are your views with respect to the rating agencies’ business model? 
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VII Appendix 2 – Experience/background of respondents 
 
Respondent  Experience/Background 
R1 Retired Investment banker. 
R2 
Over 20 years of rating, risk 
management and credit risk 
management. 
R3 
Over 40 year so of corporate 
experience. Multiple direct 
dealings with CRA's. 
R4 Commercial Law expert. 
R5 Rating expert. 
R6 
Approximately 10 years of rating 
experience. 
R7 Financial Analyst. 
R8 
Approximately 25 years of 
corporate experience including 
auditing, corporate governance 
and regulatory work. 
R9 
Over 20 years corporate 
experience and over 10 years of 
regulatory experience. 
R10 
Investment banking and regulatory 
background. 
R11 
Approximately 35 years of 
regulatory, academic and 
corporate governance experience. 
R12 
Approximately 10 years of 
corporate governance and 
regulatory experience. 
R13 
Ratings, regulatory and investment 
banking experience. 
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VIII Appendix 3 – Ethics clearance 
 
Ethics Clearance was granted by the University of the Witwatersrand. The following 
is the Ethics Clearance reference: CACCN/1057. 
 
